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SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation is a literature study of the legal regime of political parties in 
post-apartheid South Africa. A constitutional perspective is adopted 
throughout the study in order to confine the topic to the realm of South 
African law. Hence, the focus of the study is to identify legal rights contained 
in chapter two of the Constitution and to also identify other provisions of the 
Constitution that have a bearing on political parties.  
 
As mentioned in the conclusion, section 19 of the Constitution, set the scene 
for the development of this study. An analysis of the constitutional provisions 
highlighted in this study, case law and present legislation dealing with political 
parties reveals that there is a need for comparative research and the adoption 
of adequate legislation to regulate the functioning of political parties in South 
Africa. It is submitted that the regulation of parties by statute is required to 
ensure a just political order whereby the functioning of political parties is in 
line with the Constitution.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Today we are entering a new era for our country and its people. Today we 
celebrate not the victory of a party, but a victory for all the people of South 
Africa. 
~ Nelson Mandela - Inaugural speech (1994) 
 
The 27 April 1994, known today as Freedom Day, is a day of significance in 
the history of South Africa. On this day, the Interim Constitution
1
, that made 
provision for the enforcement of political rights for all South African citizens, 
“came into force”2. Moreover, on the 27 April 1994, South African citizens 
“of all races went to the polls together for the first time in the country’s history 
... to elect a Government of National Unity”.3  
 
Under our constitutional dispensation “the Constitution is the supreme law”.4 
“Parliamentary sovereignty which existed under the previous constitutional 
dispensation has thus been replaced by a system in which Parliament and all 
government bodies are subordinate to the Constitution”.5 The South African 
constitutional dispensation is characterised by a multi-party system and 
proportional representation. In UDM v President of the Republic of South 
Africa & Others
6
, the Constitutional Court expressed the view that “[a] multi-
party democracy contemplates a political order in which it is permissible for 
different political groups to organise, promote their views through public 
                                                 
1
  Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.  
2
  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-5. 
3
  H Janse van Rensburg and D Burger South Africa Yearbook (1995) Second Edition, South 
African Communication Service chapter 3, 39. Also see P De Vos, J Murphy and N Steytler 
Introduction – Free and fair Elections in N Steytler, J Murphy, P De Vos & M Rwelamira 
(eds) Free and fair Elections Kenwyn Juta (1994) xv. 
4
  Section 2 of Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Doctors for Life International 
v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC), 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 
(CC). 
5
  H Janse van Rensburg and D Burger South Africa Yearbook (1995) Second Edition, South 
 African Communication Service chapter 3, 44. 
6
  UDM v President of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2002 11 BCLR (CC); 2003 1 SA 
 495 (CC).  
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debate and participate in free and fair elections”.7 According to Rautenbach 
and Malherbe “[p]olitical parties seek to represent the people in government 
and are the vehicle for the mobilisation of the voters to participate in 
elections”.8 
 
1.2 OBJECTIVES  
 
The dissertation “Political Parties in South African Law” will focus on inter 
alia legal rights, such as for example political rights and the right to freedom 
of expression, which have a bearing on the functioning of political parties. The 
objective of this study is to identify the legal rights contained in chapter two of 
the Constitution and to further identify other provisions of the Constitution 
which are applicable to political parties. By doing so, the study proposes to 
clarify the key role of political parties as reflected by South African law. 
Furthermore, the dissertation will incorporate topics which are of importance 
to political parties, such as electoral matters. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
  
i) How are political parties governed by the Constitution? 
 
 ii) What legislation has been formulated for the regulation of political 
parties in accordance with South African law? 
 
  a) What does such legislation encompass? 
  b) What areas, if any, need yet to be addressed by legislation? 
 
1.4 IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The South African political landscape has undergone changes in order to 
reflect a just political order. For the past decade all South African citizens 
regardless of race, colour or creed have had political choices and opportunities 
                                                 
7
  Ibid par 26. 
8  RM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law (2009) Fifth Edition 130. 
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such as the right to stand for public office.   The research questions identified 
in 1.3 above will illustrate the impact that the Constitution has had on the 
regulation of political parties in post apartheid South Africa. It will 
furthermore help determine the present legal regime of political parties and 
such assessment will assist in providing recommendations for future 
advancement or improvement. 
 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
 
The study will be a combination of various methodologies. A desktop research 
will be utilised taking into consideration both primary and secondary sources. 
Journals, legislation, law reports and the internet will be relied on throughout 
the study. The topic will be researched from a constitutional perspective. 
 
1.6 LIMITATIONS 
 
(a) There is limited legal literature available on political parties in South 
African law and 
 
(b) There is to date very little South African legislation regulating political 
parties. 
  4 
CHAPTER 2 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FREEDOM TO MAKE POLITICAL 
CHOICES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
The Constitution provides that the “Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of 
democracy in South Africa. It enshrines the rights of all people in our country 
and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom”.1  
 
The Interim Constitution2 provided that “[e]very citizen shall have the right ... 
freely to make political choices”.3 The wording of the Interim Constitution 
was amended to incorporate a broader definition of political rights in the 
Constitution.4 Section 19(1) of the Constitution provides that “[e]very citizen 
is free to make political choices, which includes the right – (a) to form a 
political party; (b) to participate in the activities of, or recruit members for, a 
political party; and (c) to campaign for a political party ...”. Citizens (including 
members of political parties) therefore have the freedom to make political 
choices which includes, but is not limited to, the political rights listed in 
section 19(1).5    
 
The incorporation of section 19(1) in the Bill of Rights gives higher status to 
rights of a political nature. According to Maduna, the section 19(1) “cluster of 
[political] rights lies at the heart of a democratic constitution...”.6  As a result, 
there is a link between the section 19(1) political rights and the founding 
                                                
1  Section 7 of the Constitution.  
2  Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.  
3  Section 21 of the 1993 Constitution. 
4  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-6. 
5  P Maduna “Political Rights” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights (2005), Second Edition, Lexisnexis 
Butterworths, 14-2 fn 7:  the “general statement of the right [section 19(1)] is qualified by the 
phrase ‘which includes the right to’. The use of ‘includes’ means that the list that follows is 
exemplary, not exhaustive”.  
6  Ibid 14-1. 
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democratic constitutional values.7 The latter must therefore “be promoted 
when a court interprets the provisions [of section 19(1)] of the Constitution”.8 
This also means that any “constitutional amendments affecting political rights 
may need to satisfy the procedural requirements, not just of amendments 
impinging on the Bill of Rights, but also of amendments to the founding 
values”.9  
 
Although the Constitution defines the freedoms with regard to political parties 
or the making of political choices, it does not define what a political party is. 
In the Argus Printing and Publishing Case,10 the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court stated that “[t]here is no generally applicable legal definition 
of a political party, although definitions may be found in particular statutes”.11 
In its pursuit to interpret the meaning of the term “political party”, the court 
stated that “[i]t may, however, be suggested that an essential element of a 
political party is that it proposes candidates for election to governmental 
bodies”.12 It was further stated that “Inkatha may be described as a political 
body in the wide sense in that it enters into debates of national and 
international significance, and in the narrow sense in that Inkatha puts up 
candidates for participation in local authority and parliamentary elections...”.13 
 
Furthermore, section 19(1) of the Constitution is “a freedom right and a 
special political species of the rights to equality, freedom of expression, belief, 
                                                
7  Section 1(d) of the 1996 Constitution. Also see T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, T Roux, 
M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co 
Ltd, 10-54. 
8  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-7. Also 
see C Roederer “Founding Provisions” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd, Chapter 13. 
9  Section 1 of the 1996 Constitution. Also see section 74(1) and 74(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
Also see T Roux “Democracy” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd, 10-54.   
10  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD);
 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A). 
11  Ibid 19.  
12  Ibid 20. 
13            Ibid 5. See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 
(Unreportable), available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf wherein 
various political parties were desirous of being admitted as amicus curiae, hence in an 
application to court for such admission, the political parties stated in their heads of argument 
that they envisaged their role as being “to educate, mobilise public participation, and lobby, 
together with NGO’s, and other organs of civil society”.13    
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opinion, assembly and association”.14 This political right therefore does not 
operate in isolation. “[O]ther rights, such as [for example] the right to freedom 
of expression, the right to freedom of association, and the right to assemble 
peacefully and unarmed, are also involved in the exercise of the right freely to 
make political choices”.15  
 
2.2 THE RIGHT TO FORM A POLITICAL PARTY 
 
The registration of a political party forms a part of the formation process. The 
Electoral Act16 provides that “[a] 'registered party' means a party registered in 
terms of section 15 of the Electoral Commission Act”.17 The Act further 
provides that “[a] party may contest an election only if that party-(a) is a 
registered party; and (b) has submitted a list of candidates in terms of section 
27.”18   Registration is therefore a prerequisite for political parties “to put up 
candidates for election”.19 As proof of registration, the chief electoral officer 
issues all registered parties with a certificate of registration and the registration 
particulars of the party is published in the Government Gazette.20  
 
Whilst the Constitution guarantees the right to form a party, legislation makes 
provision for the registration of parties.21 However, the constitutional right to 
form a party and the registration requirement imposed by statute, overlap. The 
wording of the Electoral Commission Act does not state that compliance with 
the registration provision is peremptory.22 The procedural requirements for 
registration are inter alia that the prescribed payment, the party’s deed of 
foundation and the party’s constitution be attached to the application for 
                                                
14  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,   45-30. 
15  RM Rautenbach and EFJ Malherbe Constitutional Law (2009) Fifth Edition 131.  
16  Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (hereinafter “the Electoral Act”). 
17  Section 1 of the Electoral Act. 
18  Section 26 of the Electoral Act. Section 27 of the Electoral Act provides that “[a] registered 
party intending to contest an election must nominate candidates and submit a list or lists of 
those candidates for that election to the chief electoral officer...”. 
19  Ibid. P Maduna “Political Rights” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis and NRL Haysom (eds) South 
African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights (2005), Second Edition, Lexisnexis 
Butterworths, 14-4. 
20  Section 15(5) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
21  Section 19 of the Constitution. Section 15(1) – (3) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
22  Section 15-17 of the Electoral Commission Act. 
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registration.23 These legislative “requirements for registration ... pose no 
substantive barriers to a person wishing to form a political party”.24 However, 
political parties who intend to participate in any election, must forward an 
application for registration of the party, to the chief electoral officer.25 For 
example, the Congress of the People (abbreviated as COPE), registered the 
party in accordance with the Electoral Commission Act in order to participate 
in the elections.26  
 
According to the Electoral Commission Act, the chief electoral officer cannot 
register a party if for example the name, symbols, constitution or the founding 
documents of the party contains anything “propagating or inciting violence or 
hatred, or which causes serious offence to any section of the population on the 
grounds of race, gender, sex, or other listed grounds, or which indicates that 
persons will not be admitted to membership or welcomed as supporters on the 
grounds of their race, ethnic origin or colour”.27  These restrictions prohibiting 
the chief electoral officer from registering a party may be regarded as 
reasonable upon taking the aforementioned “listed grounds”28, into account.  
 
In a recent case29, African National Congress v Congress of the People, the 
ANC “applied for an interdict to restrain COPE from using the name Congress 
of the People as its name and/or persisting with its application under the 
[Electoral Commission Act] to register as a political party under”30 the name 
of COPE. The objection of the ANC to the use of the name “Congress of the 
People” by COPE was due to “the historic Congress of the People that took 
place in June 1955. [This Congress namely] the Congress of the People 
                                                
23  Section 15(3) of the Electoral Commission Act. Section 27(2) of the Electoral Act.  
24  Section 15-17 of the Electoral Commission Act. J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” 
in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-32. 
25  Section 15(1) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
26  Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 (hereinafter “the Electoral Commission Act”). African 
National Congress v Congress of the People and Others 2009 (3) SA 72 (T) 2. 
27  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-34. 
Section 16(1) (c) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
28  Ibid. 
29  African National Congress v Congress of the People and Others 2009 (3) SA 72 (T). 
30  Ibid 3. 
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adopted the Freedom Charter”.31 According to Du Plessis J, “the mere use of 
the name Congress of the People does not convey that COPE actually is the 
1955 Congress of the People. No reasonable voter, even those with but a 
passing knowledge of the relevant history, will think that COPE, a party 
established in 2008, is the event that took place in 1955. [Also those] that have 
no knowledge of the history will not be deceived because they will not know 
that the term Congress of the People might refer to a historic event”.32 
Furthermore, in response to the arguments presented by counsel on behalf of 
the ANC as regards the name “Congress of the People”, Du Plessis J reiterated 
that “the mere use of the name Congress of the People does not convey that 
[the political party] COPE has any exclusive claim to the 1955 event or to the 
Freedom Charter”.33  
 
As for the concept of unlawful competition as applicable to political parties, 
the court agreed that “the law of unlawful competition applies to political 
parties [and that] a political party may not employ unlawful means to attract 
votes”.34  For example, if COPE uses the name “Congress of the People” as a 
means to convey “a false message to the voters, [then] it will be competing 
unlawfully”.35 The question to be considered, as stated and determined by the 
court, was “whether, purely by its use of the name Congress of the People, 
COPE is conveying to the voters a false message [and in] order to determine 
whether the use of the name conveys a message and whether that message is 
false, the court must view it from the perspective of a reasonable voter who is 
reasonably informed”.36 In the papers before court, the ANC mentioned that in 
terms of section 16(1) (b) of the Electoral Commission Act “COPE will, once 
registered as a political party under that name, be entitled exclusively to use 
                                                
31  Ibid 5 wherein Du Plessis J descibed the Freedom Charter as “one of the most important 
documents in the history of this country. For some, it is the most important document in the 
history of this country. In it are embodied principles for which those who took part in the 
liberation struggle fought and suffered. Principles of the Freedom Charter underlie the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996”. 
32   Ibid 12. 
33  Ibid 13. 
34  Ibid 9. 
35   Ibid 10. 
36   Ibid 10. 
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the name Congress of the People as a name for a political party”.37 In this 
regard, the Electoral Commission Act provides that the “chief electoral officer 
may not register a party... if ... a proposed name, abbreviated name, 
distinguishing mark or symbol mentioned in the application resembles the 
name, abbreviated name, distinguishing mark or symbol, as the case may be, 
of any other registered party to such an extent that it may deceive or confuse 
voters”.38 The court found that the political party, COPE, was not guilty of 
unlawful competition on the ground that “Cope’s use of the name Congress of 
the People does not convey a false message...”39 as alleged by the ANC.40 
COPE was therefore entitled to register as a political party despite the ANC’s 
attempt to prevent COPE from doing so. 
 
Moreover, the limitation clause41 contained in the Bill of Rights allows the 
limitation of rights “in terms of law of general application”.42 The effect of the 
limitation clause is such that any limitation of the right to form a political 
party should be just and reasonable. It can be argued that the statutory 
requirement for payment of a deposit by political parties that contest elections 
may be unreasonable if it creates a barrier to registration especially if the 
payment cannot be afforded by those wanting to register a party.43 In my 
opinion, it is meaningless to form a party only to realise that affordability is an 
issue, thus preventing registration and participation in elections. Indeed, as 
stated above, the Argus case makes it clear that “an essential element of a 
                                                
37  Ibid 15. 
38  Section 16(1)(b) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
39  African National Congress v Congress of the People and Others 2009 (3) SA 72 (T) 16. 
40  Ibid. 
41  Section 36(1) provides that “[t]he rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of 
law  of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an 
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including – (a) the nature of the right; (b) the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent of the limitation; (d) the relation between 
the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose”. (2) 
Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may 
limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
42  Ibid. 
43  Section 15(3) of the Electoral Commission Act. Section 27(2) of the Electoral Act. J Brickhill 
and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-32.  
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political party is that it proposes candidates for election to governmental 
bodies”.44  
 
The Electoral Act provides that the commission is responsible for prescribing 
the amount of the deposit, if any.45 The Act further provides that the amount 
“to be deposited by a registered party contesting an election of a provincial 
legislature, must be less than the amount for contesting an election of the 
National Assembly”. It is recommended that legislation should stipulate a 
reasonable maximum amount for the deposit in order to avoid having the 
commission prescribe an excessive amount.  
 
Another issue that creates a barrier to registration and participation in elections 
is that the deposit paid by registered parties is only refundable to those parties 
who secure a seat in the elections.46 Self evidently, the risk of losing the 
deposit remains high for newly registered parties contesting elections as 
opposed to established parties who have secured seats in previous elections. 
This can be seen as yet another limitation to the right to form and register a 
party in order to participate in elections. To address this issue, legislation 
should ensure that the deposit is refundable to all registered political parties 
regardless of whether registered parties secure a seat in elections.      
 
Presently the South African legal regime supports the unrestricted formation 
of political parties.47 Indeed, section 19(1) (a) does not include any restrictions 
on the right of citizens to form a political party. In contrast, the German Basic 
Law provides that “[p]olitical parties shall participate in the formation of the 
political will of the people. They may be freely established. [Provided that 
their] internal organisation must conform to democratic principles...”.48 
                                                
44  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 20. 
45  Section 27(3) (a).  
46  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-32.  
47  Section 1(d) of the 1996 Constitution which states that South Africa is founded on “a multi-
party system of democratic government...” Also see section 19(1) of the Constitution.  
48  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-12. See 
Article 21(1) of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG) 
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Furthermore the German Basic Law makes provision for the following, 
“[p]arties that, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek 
to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order...shall be 
unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of 
unconstitutionality”.49  
 
In South Africa, a political party and its members regulate the internal 
organisation of the political party.50 A question to be considered is whether a 
Court should intervene in circumstances where the internal organisation of a 
political party is contrary to democratic principles. This is an area that has to 
date not been addressed by legislation or case law. Some authors express the 
view that, if a political party fails to adhere to democratic principles, the party 
“would fall foul of the foundational values of the Constitution”.51 
 
The Democratic Alliance Case52 illustrates whether the courts will intervene in 
disputes affecting political parties and their members. The Democratic 
Alliance proceeded with an application to court because the representation of 
the party “on three committees [of the municipal council] was considerably 
diminished”.53 The party sought the courts intervention as an “attempt to 
redress the situation by having the resolutions of the council determining the 
composition of the committees in question set aside”.54 The court application 
was dismissed on the ground that “none of the applicant’s55 rights had been 
infringed by the decisions taken at the Council meeting ... and that the 
                                                                                                                                       
promulgated on 23 May 1949 (first issue of the Federal Law Gazette, dated 23 May 1949), as 
amended up to and including 20 December 1993. 
49  Article 21(2) of Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG) 
promulgated  on 23 May 1949 (first issue of the Federal Law Gazette, dated 23 May 1949), as 
amended up to  
and including 20 December 1993. 
50  Section 19(1) (a) of the Constitution. The internal organisation of a political party may be 
classified as a “political choice” of the leader of the party.  
51  Maduna P, “Political Rights” in Cheadle  MH, Davis DM, Haysom NRL South African 
Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights (2005), Second Edition, Lexisnexis Butterworths, 
(Chapter 14) 14-4.  
52  Democratic Alliance v ANC and Others 2003 (1) BCLR 25 (C).  
53  Ibid 25 where it was stated that   legislation approved by Parliament allowed for the 
occurrence of “a political realignment ...  leading to a shift of power in the municipal council 
of the City of Cape Town”. 
54  Ibid. 
55  Hereinafter “the Democratic Alliance”. 
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[Democratic Alliance] had not made out a case for ... the relief sought by it”.56 
Van Heerden J agreed with the respondents’57 argument that “the Court should 
not allow itself to be dragged into matters which should be dealt with at a 
political or administrative level and not at a judicial level”.58 However, 
according to Mahomed CJ, “any citizen adversely affected by any decree, 
order or action of any official or body, which is not properly authorised by the 
Constitution is entitled to the protection of the Courts”.59 In my view, “any 
citizen”60 as referred to by the court can be interpreted as a broad term and 
therefore it makes provision for the protection of members of political parties 
by the courts, as political parties are composed of citizens.   
 
With regard to disputes concerning the right to just administrative action, “the 
courts should attempt to ensure that the actions of the administration are 
carefully scrutinised for compliance with the constitutional requirements of 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action”.61 In order to 
provide further clarification on the role of the courts in the sphere of 
administrative disputes, the nature of the right to just administrative action as 
applicable to political parties will be examined. Thornton assessed whether 
political parties are bound by the constitutional right to just administrative 
action by examining various provisions of the Constitution.62. The functioning 
of the right to just administrative action does not operate in isolation, but in 
correlation with other constitutional provisions. These provisions indicate that 
political parties are “protected, supported and their interests are promoted by 
the Constitution”.63  An analysis of constitutional provisions establishing the 
                                                
56  Democratic Alliance v ANC and Others 2003 (1) BCLR 25 (C) 41.  
57  Ibid 25 wherein the parties to the application were: “Applicant was the Democratic Alliance. 
First Respondent was the African National Congress; Second Respondent the New National 
Party; the third to the seventh respondents were the City Manager, the Municipal Council, the 
Speaker; the Mayor and the Executive Committee of the City of Cape Town. Eighth 
Respondent was the City of Cape Town.” 
58  Ibid 41. Also see Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier, Western Cape and 
Others 2002 (9) BCLR 891,  2002 (3) SA 265 (CC). 
59  http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZASCA/1999/50.html par 14. 
60  Ibid.  
61   K Klaaren and G Penfold “Just Administrative Action” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 63-5. 
62  L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political Parties 
Bound? (1999) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 351.  
63  Ibid 368. 
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link between political parties and the right to just administrative action, as 
indicated by Thornton, is discussed below.  
 
The Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”.64 Importantly, the right 
to just administrative action forms a part of the Bill of Rights.65 Section 8(1), 
the application clause, provides that the Bill of Rights applies to “all organs of 
state”.66 The question is whether political parties can be classified as an organ 
of state. Section 239 (b) of the Constitution defines organ of state as “any 
other functionary or institution – (i) exercising a power or performing a 
function in terms of the Constitution or ... (ii) exercising a public power or 
performing a public function in terms of any legislation...”.67 Thornton found 
that it is unclear whether political parties are organs of state when exercising a 
power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution and political 
parties therefore do not satisfy section 239 (b) (i) of the definition of “organ of 
state”.68 However, upon reliance on section 239(b) (ii), in order for a political 
party to be defined as an organ of state, it must exercise a public power or a 
public function in terms of legislation. Thornton concludes that “to the extent 
that a political party is exercising a public power or performing a public 
function in terms of legislation, it is an organ of state”.69  Therefore, a political 
party would qualify as an organ of state when the procedure of “choosing of 
lists of candidates for national and provincial elections” is undertaken by the 
party, in accordance with electoral legislation.70 As a result, when a political 
party meets the requirements of section 8(1) of the Constitution and section 
239 (b) (ii), it follows that the party is an organ of state and as an organ of 
state the party has the right to just administrative action.71 
 
                                                
64  Section 33(1) of the Constitution.  
65  Section 33 of the Constitution.  
66  Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
67  Section 239. 
68  L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political Parties 
Bound? (1999) 15 South African Journal of Human Rights 354. 
69  Ibid 356. 
70  Ibid 353.  
71  Ibid 355. Section 8 (1) of the Constitution.  
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In summary, bearing in mind Thornton’s conclusion in respect of the 
application clause and section 239 (b) (ii), case law dealing with 
administrative action may then be applicable to political parties as well. In 
respect of the intervention of the courts in administrative disputes, Chaskalson 
P mentioned that “[a]s long as the purpose sought to be achieved by the 
exercise of public power is within the authority of the functionary, and as long 
as the functionary’s decision, viewed objectively, is rational, a Court cannot 
interfere with the decision simply because it disagrees with it or considers that 
the power was exercised inappropriately. A decision that is objectively 
irrational is likely to be made only rarely but, if this does occur, a Court has 
the power to intervene and set aside the irrational decision.”72 Thus, the South 
African legal regime supports the formation and functioning of political 
parties with no intervention by the judiciary, provided the dispute is outside 
the court’s domain.  
 
Thornton went further and assessed whether political parties may be bound by 
the right to just administrative action in terms of an alternative provision of the 
application clause. Hence, section 8(2) of the Constitution provides that “[a] 
provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right”. Her analysis of section 33 of the 
Constitution revealed that the definition of the right to just administrative 
action as stated in the Constitution is not conclusive.73 The nature of this right, 
in her view, covers “public and private administration” because the 
constitutional provision does not state that it applies exclusively to “public” or 
“private” administration.74 Davis J supports Thornton’s observation that both 
public and private institutions exercise power and that “[a]dministrative law 
principles are designed to protect us from the exercise of that power.”75 
                                                
72  K Klaaren and G Penfold “Just Administrative Action” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 63-16. 
Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex 
parte President of the RSA and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC), 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) at par 
90. 
73  L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political Parties 
Bound? (1999) 15 SAJHR 359. 
74  Ibid.  
75  Ibid. Max v Independent Democrat s and Others 2006 (3) SA 112 at 117.  
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Thornton is therefore of the view that juristic persons such as political parties 
may be bound by the right to just administrative action.76  
 
An example of the right to just administrative action as applicable to a 
political party as a juristic person arises when a party exercises the power to 
dismiss a member of a party who is a member of the legislature as well.77  
Davis J found Thornton’s article relevant to the facts that arose in the 
Independent Democrats and Others Case78. This case dealt with the dismissal 
of a member of a registered party who was also a member of the provincial 
legislature.79 The party suspended the member on the basis that he did not 
adhere to party obligations in his capacity as party member and party 
representative.80 The disciplinary enquiry conducted by an independent person 
led to the handing down of a report summarising the outcome of the enquiry.81 
In terms of the report, the applicant was found guilty and immediate expulsion 
was recommended.82 The aggrieved member then lodged an appeal and 
proceeded with an application to court relying on two contentions.83 Firstly, 
the contention that the principles of administrative justice either in terms of 
PAJA, failing which, in terms of the common law is applicable to the 
disciplinary proceedings.84 Secondly, that the “lodging of the appeal suspends 
the effect of the order against which the appeal is made”.85  
 
Davis J confirmed that the exercise of the power of dismissal by a party should 
to be in line with “modern administrative law, and more so, with the 
Constitution which enshrines a foundational principle of accountability and 
fairness”.86 Also the learned judge emphasised that if a party “expels a 
member, its decision has public implications in that the expelled person can no 
                                                
76  L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political Parties 
Bound? (1999) 15 SAJHR 359. 
77  Ibid 370. Max v Independent Democrat s and Others 2006 (3) SA 112 at 118.  
78  Max v Independent Democrat s and Others 2006 (3) SA 112 . 
79  Ibid 115. 
80  Ibid. 
81  Ibid 116.  
82  Ibid.  
83  Ibid 116 -117. 
84  Ibid 116.  
85  Ibid 117.   
86  Ibid 122. 
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longer represent the electorate which voted for that particular party.”87 
Accordingly, the consequences is such that in the event that the party member 
is “unfairly expelled from the party only to be restored to his position in the 
party upon appeal, this would be an action of the kind which could not be 
repaired. A vacancy in the legislature would not be available and applicant, 
therefore, could not be restored to membership of the legislature”.88 As a 
result, the court found that the circumstances of this case are such that the 
balance of convenience favours the aggrieved member.89 The court order inter 
alia declared that: (1) no vacancy in respect of the applicant’s seat exists in the 
provincial legislature; (2) an interdict is granted, prohibiting the party and 
others from filling the seat of the applicant in the provincial legislature, until 
finalisation of the internal disciplinary appeal and (3) the award of the 
nominated person who dealt with the disciplinary proceedings, is “suspended 
pending the finalisation of the internal appeal”.90 
 
However, although the above constitutional provisions may indicate that "in 
certain circumstances, political parties are bound by the right to just 
administrative action because they are considered organs of state in some of 
those circumstances and in others because the Constitution is applicable to 
them as juristic persons"91, the above analysis was not supported by the court 
in the Ismail Case92. In this case, the party charged the applicant for inter alia 
“breach of party discipline”.93 Prior to the commencement of the disciplinary 
hearing and at the first hearing, the applicant requested a public hearing.94 The 
party regarded the dispute as an internal party matter with no bearing on 
public interest and thus, refused the applicant’s request.95 A stay of the 
                                                
87            Ibid 122. 
88  Ibid 124.  
89  Ibid 124.  
90  Ibid 125. 
91  L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political Parties 
Bound? (1999) 15 SAJHR 351. 
92  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others [2001] JOL 8206 (C). 
93  Ibid 2.  
94  Ibid 4.  
95  Ibid 4 and 7.  
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disciplinary proceedings was agreed to between the parties.96 The applicant 
then proceeded with an application to court.97  
 
In the review application, counsel for the applicant referred to Thornton’s 
article and argued that disciplinary proceedings may be classified as 
administrative action, “within the meaning of section 33”.98 The crux of the 
applicant’s contention is that the principles of administrative law apply when a 
party member who also represents the legislature, is dismissed by the party.99 
Binns-Ward AJ assessed whether “an internal function of a political party may 
result in the public being affected through a change in membership of the 
legislature”.100 The Constitution101 provides that national legislation i.e. the 
Electoral Act102 prescribe the electoral procedure103 for party members to 
acquire a seat in the legislature.104 The courts analysis revealed that the 
requirements for a party member to become a member of the legislature 
depend on the “proportional support obtained by the party to which the 
individual belongs, together with his or her position on the [party] list”.105 The 
learned judge stated that “[j]ust because [the compilation of a party list by a 
political party] is done in the context of relevant legislation does not render it 
per se a public function (or the exercise of a public power) by the actor”.106 
The court concluded that, although section 33 of the Constitution and the 
provisions of PAJA do not apply to disciplinary proceedings, common law 
administrative principles are applicable.107 Thus, the court application was 
                                                
96  Ibid 8.  
97  Ibid 7.  
98  Ibid 23.  
99  Ibid 24. L Thornton “The Constitutional Right to Just Administrative Action – Are Political 
Parties Bound? (1999) 15 SAJHR 370.  
100  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others [2001] JOL 8206 (C) 24.  
101  Section 42, 46 and 105(1). 
102  Act 73 of 1998.  
103  Section 26 and 27 of the Electoral Act. 
104  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others [2001] JOL 8206 (C) 25.  
105  Ibid 25.  
106  Ibid  26.  
107  Ibid 32. . Section 39(3) of the Constitution provides that “[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny 
the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill”. Also section 
39(2) provides that “[w]hen interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights”. 
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dismissed and as a result, a public hearing of the disciplinary proceedings was 
not approved.108 
 
In conclusion, two cases have been presented here, one which corroborates 
Thornton’s argument and another which does not.  In my opinion, although the 
court did not view the dismissal of a member of the party and legislature as a 
public function in the Ismail case, I agree with Thornton’s argument. In my 
view, dismissing a party member and representative from the legislature may 
change the relationship between the party and the electorate. Therefore, the 
principles of just administrative action are applicable to political parties since 
dismissal of party members can be classified as a public power or public 
function, as it has an influence on the electorate. 
 
2.3 THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVITIES OF, OR 
RECRUIT MEMBERS FOR, A POLITICAL PARTY 
 
Section 19(1) (b) of the Constitution provides that citizens have the right to 
participate in the activities of a political party and the right to recruit members 
for a political party. This political right firstly complements the right to 
freedom of association because section 19(1) (b) creates the option for citizens 
to choose whether to associate or not to associate with a political party. 
Secondly, section 19(1) (b) broadens the right to freedom of association 
because it categorises the association of citizens with political parties, more 
specifically it emphasises the making of political choices.  
 
Section 18 of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
freedom of association”.109 Both section 18 and section 19 of the Constitution 
have provisions in relation to freedom of association. However, section 18 has 
a broad provision on everyone’s right freedom of association, while section 19 
goes further to specify freedom of association in relation to political parties.  
                                                
108  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others [2001] JOL 8206 (C) 34.  
109  Article 22(1) of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter 
“ICCPR”)  provides that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of association with 
others...” See also Article 20(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This Article 
also provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of ... association”.  
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According to Patel DJP, a “political party is a voluntary association, and a 
voluntary association is founded on the basis of mutual agreement, which 
entails an intention to associate, and consensus on the essential characteristics 
and objectives of the association”.110 This expression, freedom of association, 
amounts to “a general capacity for citizens to join without interference ... in 
associations [such as political parties] in order to attain various ends”.111 In 
addition, “[n]o one may be compelled to belong to an association”.112 As an 
illustration, the International Labour Convention113 (on the Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) provides that with regard 
to freedom of association, “[w]orkers and employers [similarly citizens], 
without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to ... subject only to the 
rules of the organisation [political party] concerned, to join organisations 
[political parties] of their own choosing without previous authorisation”.114  
 
The decision to associate with a political party may lead to an application for 
membership being submitted to the political party for consideration. In the 
Mcoyi and Others Case115, the court noted that the relationship between a 
party and its members “is a contractual one, the terms of the contract being 
contained in the constitution of the party”.116 Also, provisions of a party’s 
constitution are relied on to qualify or disqualify membership. Since “political 
parties are voluntary associations, they are not created by government and are 
thus generally not regulated by statute. Party members decide on the 
                                                
110  Mcoyi and Others v Inkatha Freedom Party, Magwaza-Msibi v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 
(4) SA 298 (KZP) par 30. Also see Yiba and Others v African Gospel Church 1999 (2) SA 
949 (C). 
111  Appl. 6094/73, D&R 9 (1978) 5 (7). Van Dijk, P and Van Hoof, GJH, Theory and Practice of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (1990) Deventer, The Netherlands, Kluwer 592. I 
Fredericks “The Legal regulation of  Political Parties and their Participation in Elections” in N 
Steytler, J Murphy, P De Vos & M Rwelamira (eds) Free and fair Elections Kenwyn Juta 
(1994) 75. 
112  Article 20(2). 
113  Hereinafter “IOL”. 
114  Article 2 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 
87 of 1948, ratified by South in 1995. 
115  Mcoyi and Others v Inkatha Freedom Party, Magwaza-Msibi v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 
(4) SA 298 (KZP). 
116  Mcoyi and Others v Inkatha Freedom Party, Magwaza-Msibi v Inkatha Freedom Party 2011 
(4) SA 298 (KZP). Also see Matlholwa v Mahuma and Others C [2009] 3 All SA 238 (SCA) 
par 8. 
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qualifications for membership and the structure of the party”.117 A political 
party may therefore decline an application for membership if the prospective 
member does not meet the qualifications for membership as listed in the party 
constitution.118 Furthermore, if a member of a political party breaches the 
party constitution, the member may be subjected to disciplinary procedures 
which could lead to expulsion.119 Thus, the question is whether the conduct of 
political parties, such as a decision to decline an application for membership 
or a decision to expel or suspend a member of the party, infringes section 18 
and section 19(1) (b) of the Constitution. 
 
 “In so far as the constitutions of the various political parties constrain 
members of political parties or other individuals from participating, [section 
18 and section 19(1) (b) of the Constitution] will be of limited assistance. It 
will not enable applicants to challenge admission criteria or members to 
dispute intra-party decision-making mechanisms or disciplinary 
procedures”.120 In the Ismail Case121, it was held that in the “absence of 
express provisions in the domestic constitution [of the party] it is open to the 
party entitled to convene a private disciplinary enquiry to institute any 
procedure considered appropriate as long as it complies with the rules of 
natural justice”.122 The rules of natural justice are “common law rules which 
have to be observed before any administrative action may be taken...These 
rules have crystallised in practice into the principles of audi alteram partem 
(literally: hear the other side) and nemo judex in sua causa (literally: no-one 
may be a judge in his own cause)...”.123 The effect is that if “the rules of 
                                                
117  I Fredericks “The Legal regulation of  Political Parties and their Participation in Elections” in 
N Steytler, J Murphy, P De Vos & M Rwelamira (eds) Free and fair Elections Kenwyn Juta 
(1994) 76. 
118  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-32. 
119  Harding v Independent Democrats and Others 2008 2 All SA 199 (C) 202; UDM v President 
of the Republic of South Africa & Others 2002 11 BCLR (CC); 2003 1 SA 495 (CC) par 71.  
120  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-34. 
121  Ismail v New National Party in the Western  Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C). 
122  Ibid 16. 
123  Colen P, “Organs of State and the Rules of Natural Justice” retrievable from 
http://www.bclr.com/EntrepreneurArticles/BCLR%202009%2007.pdf.  
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‘natural justice’ have not been observed, an aggrieved person can approach an 
appropriate court that will enforce the rules as a matter of policy”.124 
 
It was further held in the Ismail Case125 that, by “becoming a member of a 
private body such as [a political party, the member of the political party] 
agreed to be bound by [the party constitution] and to be amenable to the 
disciplinary processes permitted thereunder”.126 In May 2010 Julius 
“Malema127 admitted to violating party rules by dividing the ANC ... He was 
forced to apologize, seek anger-management help and agreed to pay a 10,000 
rand ... fine. He was also warned that he risked suspension from the party if he 
committed a similar infraction in the next two years”.128 Due to the recurrence 
of a similar violation by Malema which fell within the two year warning 
period, as will be discussed below, his ANC “membership has been suspended 
for a period of 2 (two) years”.129  
 
Recently the ANC charged130 Malema and another five131 members of the 
ANC youth league with various charges which include “bringing the party in 
disrepute”132 and “sowing divisions in ANC ranks”.133 Ultimately the 
                                                
124  Ibid. 
125  Ismail v New National Party in the Western  Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C). 
126  Ibid 18. 
127  Leader of ANC youth league and ANC member.  
128  M Cohen,“South Africa’s Malema May Face Suspension From Ruling ANC” [retrievable 
from http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-08-19/south-africa-s-malema-may-face-
suspension-from-ruling-anc.html]. Also see M Bosch, “Malema facing suspension for ‘sowing 
division’ in ranks”  Weekend Post 20 August 2011 at 2.  
129  “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-text-of-anc-disciplinary-
hearings/. 
130  Ibid.  The ANC members were charged on the 16th November 2011. 
131  “ANC disciplinary committee refuses Malema recusal application”  retrievable from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-disciplinary-committee-refuses-malema-recusal-
application-2011-09-01 wherein Sapa stated that “[c]harged with him are ANCYL 
spokesperson Floyd Shivambu, deputy president Ronald Lamola, treasurer general Pule Mabe, 
secretary general Sindiso Magaqa and deputy secretary general Kenetswe Masenogi”. See also 
public statement, by the disciplinary committee that the “NDC is also cognisant that those 
charged are national leaders of the ANC Youth League and is of the view that their leadership 
positions impose on them a responsibility to conduct themselves, in all respects, in an 
exemplary manner, serving as role models to young people”, contained in “Malema et al: Full 
Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-text-of-anc-disciplinary-
hearings/.  
132  M Bosch, “Malema facing suspension for ‘sowing division’ in ranks” retrievable from the 
Weekend Post 20 August 2011 at 2. 
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members of the party were charged “for violations of the ANC 
Constitution”.134 The ANC proceeded with a disciplinary hearing.135 Malema’s 
application for the recusal of three members of the ANC’s National 
Disciplinary Committee (NDC)136 members was refused on the basis “that 
insufficient facts had been presented to show bias or a perception of bias”137 
by the designated chairpersons’.138  
 
The NDC is authorised in terms of the party constitution to impose various 
sanctions such as the temporary suspension139 of members’ found guilty of 
violating the party constitution. According to the NDC, a “person, who has 
been found guilty [of violating the party constitution] by an ANC disciplinary 
proceeding resulting in the imposition of the penalties of suspension, 
temporary/forfeiture of membership rights or expulsion, such penalties shall 
have the same application in all structures of the ANC Youth League”.140  The 
NDC held that Malema’s membership be suspended for a period of five years 
in respect of his recent violation of the ANC Constitution.141 This penalty 
imposed by the NDC runs concurrently with the two year membership 
                                                                                                                                       
133  “ANC disciplinary committee refuses Malema recusal application” retrievable from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-disciplinary-committee-refuses-malema-recusal-
application-2011-09-01. 
134  “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-text-of-anc-disciplinary-
hearings/.  Rule 4.15 of the ANC Constitution retrievable from 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207 wherein it is stated that the party constitution 
requires that members of the ANC “respect the Constitution and structures” of the party. 
135  “ANC disciplinary committee refuses Malema recusal application” retrievable from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-disciplinary-committee-refuses-malema-recusal-
application-2011-09-01. Rule 25.6 of the ANC Constitution retrievable from 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207.  
136  Rule 25.6(a) of the ANC Constitution retrievable from 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207. “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary 
Hearings” retrievable from http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-
text-of-anc-disciplinary-hearings/ wherein it is stated that the “NDC is a structure appointed 
by the NEC of the ANC tasked with the responsibility to consider any violation of the ANC 
constitution based on the evidence before it”. 
137  “ANC disciplinary committee refuses Malema recusal application” retrievable from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-disciplinary-committee-refuses-malema-recusal-
application-2011-09-01. 
138  Ibid. 
139  Rule 25.12 of the ANC Constitution retrievable from 
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207. 
140  “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-text-of-anc-disciplinary-
hearings/. 
141  Ibid. 
  23 
suspension mentioned above.142 In addition, Malema was ordered “to vacate 
his position as President of the ANC Youth League”.143 The NDC informed 
Malema of his right to lodge an appeal to the National Disciplinary Committee 
of Appeal (NDCA) within the 14 day time period and an appeal was lodged.144   
 
Also, ANC party members who supported the charged members of the ANC 
youth league were guilty of misconduct because on the first day of the 
disciplinary hearing, a “small number of supporters marched in the streets 
around the ANC's Luthuli House headquarters...”145 and “threw rocks, bottles 
and bricks at journalists and police...”.146 As a result, “Julius Malema, Ronald 
Lamola, Pule Mabe, SindisoMagaqa and Kenetswe Mosenogi were held 
accountable and charged for contravening Rule 25.5 (o) and Rule 25.5 (q)147 
of the ANC Constitution as well as, for undermining the Secretary General of 
                                                
142  Ibid. 
143  Ibid. 
144  "ANCYL leaders submit appeals", http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Politics/Malema-
ANCYL-leaders-submit-appeals-20111125. “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary 
Hearings” retrievable from http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-
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145   “ANC disciplinary committee refuses Malema recusal application” retrievable from 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/anc-disciplinary-committee-refuses-malema-recusal-
application-2011-09-01. 
146  Ibid. “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
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hearings/. 
147  Rule 25.5(o) and rule 25.5(q) of the ANC Constitution retrievable from  
http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207 which provides that the:  
 
“following conduct by a member or public representative shall constitute misconduct in respect of 
which disciplinary proceedings may be invoked and instituted against him or her: ... 
 
(o) Prejudicing the integrity or repute of the organisation, its personnel or its operational capacity by:  
 
aa. Impeding the activities of the organisation;  
bb. Creating division within its ranks or membership;  
cc. Doing any other act, which undermines its effectiveness as an organisation; or  
dd. Acting on behalf of or in collaboration with: 
  
i. Counter-revolutionary forces; 
ii. A political organisation or party other than an organisation or party in 
alliance with the ANC in a manner contrary to the aims, policies and 
objectives of the ANC; 
iii. Intelligence or the security services of other countries; or 
iv. Any person or group who seriously interferes with the work of the 
organisation or prevents it from fulfilling its mission and objectives... [and] 
 
(q) Deliberately disrupting meetings and interfering with the orderly functioning of the 
organisation...” 
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the ANC”.148 The penalty was the suspension of their membership for two 
years; such suspension “suspended for a period of three years and will be 
implemented if the respondents are found guilty of any contravention of the 
ANC`s Code of Conduct within the said period”.149  
 
In summary, the powers that political parties are entitled to exercise in the 
sphere of disciplinary proceedings are those that are derived from their party 
constitution, bearing in mind the provisions of the Constitution. 
 
The issue of the liability of political parties for the misconduct of their 
members, more specifically vicarious liability, arises “only when facts are 
proved which give rise to such liability at common law”.150 There is no 
legislation dealing with liability issues such as the aforementioned, in South 
Africa.  
 
In addition, participation in political activities on voting day also has to be 
considered. According to section 108 of the Electoral Act, participation in 
political meetings or events is not permitted on voting day and the only 
activity permitted in the area of the voting station on voting day is the casting 
of one’s vote.151 Although this provision serves “to protect the right freely to 
make political choices”152, whether this provision is constitutional is a 
question of interpretation. In my opinion, this provision is constitutional 
because it prevents unfair influence by political parties or their members on 
the voter’s political choice on voting day.   
 
                                                
148  “Malema et al: Full Text of ANC Disciplinary Hearings” retrievable from 
http://www.publiceyenews.com/2011/11/14/malema-et-al-full-text-of-anc-disciplinary-
hearings/. 
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150  National party v Jamie NO & Another 1994 (3) SA 483, 494 (ECW); Inkatha Freedom Party 
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Another issue that has an impact on participation with political parties is the 
privacy rights of individuals. Political parties must ensure that they do not 
infringe upon the privacy rights of individuals. Also, political parties and their 
members must act in accordance with the provisions of the Electoral Code.153 
The Constitution provides that “everyone has the right to privacy...”.154 The 
Electoral Code provides that, on the one hand, “[n]o person may offer any 
inducement or reward to another person to attend or not to attend a public 
meeting, march, demonstration, rally or other public political event”155 and, on 
the other hand, “[n]o person may offer any inducement or reward to another 
person to join or not to join a party”.156 A similar provision is contained in the 
Electoral Act which provides that “[n]o person may compel or unlawfully 
persuade any person to attend and participate in, or not to attend and 
participate in, any political meeting, march, demonstration or other political 
event”.157 Hence, political parties must take adequate measures to prevent their 
members from infringing these provisions of the Electoral Code and Electoral 
Act. This is because, in doing so, political parties must not only guard against 
the infringement of the privacy rights of individuals but also of their right to 
freedom of association. 
 
Furthermore, in considering the applicability of section 19 of the Constitution 
to the provision of donation records by political parties, Griesel J stated that 
“the question is whether the applicants reasonably require the respondents’ 
donation records for the period in question in order to exercise or protect their 
right to ‘make political choices’... ”158 The applicants argued that “citizens 
have the right ‘to make political choices’, which the applicants interpret as 
being ‘the right, in the first place, to choose between political parties’. They 
submitted further that, in exercising his or her choice, an individual is entitled 
to have to hand relevant information about a party, its policies and 
                                                
153          Section 3 of the Electoral Code contained in Electoral Act 78 of 1998 (hereinafter referred  
to as the Electoral Code). 
154  Section 14 of the Constitution. 
155  Section 9(2)(a)(ii). 
156  Section 9(2) (a) (i) of the Electoral Code. 
157          Section 87(1)(a)(v) of the Electoral Act. 
158  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others 
2005 (5) SA 39 (C) 10. 
  26 
finances”.159 The Judge stated that “the question whether the respondents are 
obliged to make disclosure of their donations records must be decided on an 
interpretation of our own legislation and the application of that legislation to 
the facts of the matter under consideration”.160 With regard to the case of the 
Applicants, the court mentioned that the Applicants did not “explain how the 
respondents’ donation records would assist them in exercising or protecting 
any of the rights on which they rely or why, in the absence of those donation 
records, they are unable to exercise those rights”.161	   Accordingly,	   Griesel J 
supported the view of the parties that the manner in which to regulate the 
funding of political parties is to be determined by the legislature and not the 
court.162 Thus learned judge found that “[d]onor secrecy does not impugn any 
of the rights contained in...” section 19 of the Constitution.163 After due 
consideration of existing legislation and the facts of the case, the court found 
that “the respondents are not obliged to disclose...”164 records of private 
donations received by the party and the application was therefore dismissed.165 
Further discussion in relation to political party funding will be discussed 
below.  
 
2.4 THE RIGHT TO CAMPAIGN FOR A POLITICAL PARTY 
 
Section 19(1) (c) of the Constitution provides that citizens have the right to 
campaign for their political party. The Electoral Code gives effect to the right 
of citizens to campaign by making provision for “free political campaigning 
...”166 in South Africa. Campaigning provides an opportunity for “[p]otential 
voters [to] have sufficient access to information about [political] parties, their 
platforms and their candidates. Parties and their candidates must [also] have 
                                                
159  Ibid. 
160  Ibid wherein it was stated that “the right to access to information is not a right that exists in 
the abstract... on the contrary, the inquiry is a factual one and the person seeking the 
information must make out a case therefore on the papers.” 
161  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others 
2005 (5) SA 39 (C) 10. 
162  Ibid 11. 
163  Ibid. 
164  Ibid 12. 
165  Ibid. 
166  Section 1 (b). 
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sufficient access to the potential voters to canvass their support”.167 During the 
campaigning period political “parties can present candidates and leaders to the 
electorate and seek to mobilise the support of the electorate by [means of for 
example] propaganda, organised activities and by emphasising ideological 
differences with other parties in competitive party systems”.168 South Africa’s 
“multi-party system...”169makes provision for competitiveness amongst 
political parties. 
  
The media is an essential campaigning tool for political parties. The 
Constitution provides that “[n]ational legislation must establish an 
independent authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, and to 
ensure fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing South African 
society”.170  The legislation that gives effect to this constitutional provision is 
the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act171. This Act 
establishes “an independent Authority which ... [regulates] broadcasting in the 
public interest and ... [ensures] fairness and a diversity of views broadly 
representing South African society”.172  
 
In relation to the right to equality, the following is taken into consideration: (1) 
whether biased broadcasting or reporting with regard to a particular political 
party, by the press and media and (2) whether the exclusion of unrepresented 
political parties from the acquisition of state funding, amounts to an 
infringement of the right to equality.  
 
The Constitution provides that “[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal... benefit of the law”.173 Indeed, “incorrect or biased reporting 
may distort the truth, give the public an unfair perception of a candidate or the 
                                                
167  P De Vos  “Free and Fair campaigning” in N Steytler , J Murphy,P  De Vos & M Rwelamira  
(eds) Free and  fair Elections Kenwyn Juta 119. A.R  
168  Ball Modern Politics and Government Fifth Edition (1993). The Macmillan Press Ltd, 
Houndmills Basingstoke Hampshire RG21 2XS London 80. 
169  Section 1(d) of the Constitution.  
170  Section 192 of the Constitution. 
171  Independent Communication Authority of South Africa Act 2000 No. 13 of 2000, as amended 
by the Broadcasting Amendment Act 64 of 2002. 
172  Section 2 (a) of  Independent Communication Authority of South Africa Act 2000 No. 13 of  
              2000, as amended by the Broadcasting Amendment Act 64 of 2002. 
173  Section (9) (1) of the Constitution. 
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process, and thereby undermine election integrity”.174 The media has the 
power to destroy the credibility of the party if “unsubstantiated allegations of 
illegal or unethical activities” about the party are reported.175 This may occur 
if the media is biased. Also, biased reporting occurs when the media 
“give preferential treatment to large advertisers” such as political parties, who 
pay for party advertisements.176 Not all parties have sufficient funds to cover 
advertising costs. Biased reporting may result in a contravention of the 
equality clause of the Constitution because it “can undermine the principle of 
equal treatment for all”.177 Statutory regulations guard against incorrect or 
biased reporting in South Africa.178 The Electoral Act provides that “[n]o 
person may publish any false information with the intention of − (a) disrupting 
or preventing an election; (b) creating hostility or fear in order to influence the 
conduct or outcome of an election; or (c) influencing the conduct or outcome 
of an election”.179  
 
Moreover, political parties realise “that fighting an election in any society is 
an expensive business, and that no matter what enthusiasm there might be for 
a particular cause, elections in large are won or lost in general proportion to 
the funds available for fighting for them”.180 The Constitution provides that 
“[t]o enhance multi-party democracy, national legislation must provide for the 
funding of political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures 
on an equitable and proportional basis”.181 The right to campaign for a 
political party is therefore supported by the Public Funding of Represented 
Political Parties Act182. This Act makes provision for the allocation of funds to 
political parties in order to promote “active participation by individual citizens 
                                                
174  "Media" retrieved from http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/eic/eic07.  
175  Ibid. 
176  Ibid. 
177  Ibid. 
178  Ibid. 
179  Section 89(2) of the Electoral Act.  
180  L Fernandez  “The Legal Regulation of campaign financing” in  N Steytler, J Murphy, P De 
Vos &  M Rwelamira (eds) Free and fair Elections Kenwyn Juta 99. 
181  Section 236. 
182  Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997. Also see “South Africa: 
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act” retrieved from 
http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/soulaws6c.htmthe wherein it was stated that the “Promotion of     
Multi-Party Democracy Bill was introduced in 1997. This Bill was later passed as the Public 
Funding of Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 1997.” 
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in political life”.183 “Public funding for political parties is justified as one 
means to advance the diversity of representation while advocating 
accountability, equity and the like...”.184 The Act provides that represented 
political parties receive benefit from the Fund “in accordance with a 
prescribed formula based in part, on the principle of proportionality ... and in 
part, on the principle of equity...”.185  
 
No “constitutional entitlement to state funding”186 exists for unrepresented 
political parties in South Africa. According to the Constitution, 
“[u]nrepresented parties do not qualify for state funding”.187 The question is 
whether the constitutional exclusion of unrepresented political parties from the 
acquisition of state funding, contravenes the equality clause. The equality 
clause is applicable to all political parties because they are entitled to equal 
benefit of the law188:   
 
“[An] equality challenge is ... unlikely to succeed for two reasons. First, the Public 
Funding of Represented Political Parties Act satisfies the requirement in [section 236 of 
the Constitution] that national legislation be enacted to regulate public funding of 
political parties. The legislation contemplated by [section 236 of the Constitution] is 
expressly required to provide for the funding of parties ‘participating in national and 
provincial legislatures’... Secondly, it could be argued that the differentiation between 
represented parties and unrepresented parties [creates difficulty in ascertaining] the 
support for unrepresented parties, and therefore the amount of state support that should 
be given to them”.189  
 
The regulation of private funding received by political parties has not yet been 
dealt with by South African legislation. “[P]rivate domestic and foreign 
                                                
183          Section 5(1)(b) (iv). 
184  D Pottie “Party Finance and the Politics of Money in Southern Africa” (2003) Vol. 21 (1) 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 6. 
185  Section 2(a)(i) and (ii) of the Public Funding for Represented Political Parties Act 103 of 
1997. 
186  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-36. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Section 9(1) of the Constitution.  
189  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd,  45-37. 
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donations are [therefore] largely unregulated...”.190 The options of political 
parties, regarding private funding, vary. Funds are retrievable from for 
example sectors of society, from international contributions or from 
membership fee payments received by the party.191  
 
With reference to the regulation of the private funding received from political 
parties, the question is whether allowing these private donations to political 
parties without disclosure thereof to the public, is justified in our constitutional 
dispensation. It could be argued that political parties, who fail to provide 
transparency of the funds received by them, create “scope for corruption on 
the part of politicians”.192  
 
In the Institute for Democracy in South Africa Case193, IDASA together with 
other applicants proceeded with an application to the High Court wherein they 
sought “to establish the principle that political parties, or at least those who 
hold seats in the national, provincial and local government legislatures, are 
obliged ... to disclose particulars of all the substantial donations they receive, 
on due and proper request for those particulars made by any adult South 
African citizen”.194 Various political parties namely the “African National 
Congress (ANC), the Democratic Alliance (DA), the Inkatha Freedom Party 
(IFP) and the [then] New National Party (NNP)”, (hereinafter “the 
                                                
190         D Pottie “Party Finance and the Politics of Money in Southern Africa” (2003) Vol. 21 (1) 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 6. 
191          L Fernandez  “The Legal Regulation of campaign financing” in  N Steytler , J Murphy,  P De 
Vos & M Rwelamira (eds) Free and fair Elections Kenwyn Juta 100-10.   In the following 
article, D Pottie “Party Finance and the Politics of Money in Southern Africa” (2003) Vol. 21 
(1) Journal of Contemporary African Studies 10 , it is stated that “[a] basic typology of party 
finance includes the following categories: [p]ublic funding: the funding may be allocated on 
an annual basis or election campaign related only. The method of allocation to parties may be 
based on level of voter support (and may include additional threshold of voter support in order 
to qualify), or on the number of elected seats (may also include threshold). Indirect forms of 
support might include: free public media access, use of public buildings for political meetings, 
free security for party leadership and political rallies, subsidised or free postal rates, tax 
subsidies. Private Funding: political parties may be subject to rules on disclosure as well as 
campaign spending limits”.  
192   IDASA “Democracy & Party Political Funding” available at 
http://www.idasa.org/media/uploads/outputs/files/PARTY%20FUNDING%20COURT%20C
ASE%20BRIEFING%209%20may.pdf.  
193  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others  
2005 (5) SA 39 (C).  
194  Ibid 4. See also section 32(1) of the Constitution and section 11 or section 50 of the Promotion 
of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) as these where the legislative provisions relied 
on by the applicants.  
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Respondents”), opposed the application.195 The Respondents’ favoured the 
legislative regulation of private funding of political parties as opposed to “ad 
hoc litigation in the courts”.196 In contrast to the Respondents’ who sought a 
dismissal of the application, the ANC sought a stay of the proceeding in order 
to “allow the political and legislative process to follow the proper course 
necessary for the adoption of a national policy through legislation regulating 
the funding of political parties with the Republic of South Africa”.197 The 
heads of argument presented by counsel, on behalf of the ANC, contained an 
affirmation by the party that “the question of regulation and control of private 
donor funding of political parties should be addressed and implemented 
through a legislative process which will embody national policy perspectives 
and the balancing of the rights and interests of all persons, including the 
electorate, political parties and their donors”.198 The stance taken by the ANC 
and the other parties, during the court proceedings in the Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa Case199, is of relevance when looking at the 
present legal regime and the lack of progress in this area of legal reform in 
South Africa. Furthermore, the Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
confirmed its decision to “[c]ontinue to work with all political parties, to 
support a process that ensures that an appropriate transparency and regulatory 
regime is designed for South Africa ...[and to monitor] the political and 
legislative process, [holding] political parties accountable to promises made to 
the Court...”.200 Despite this undertaking by the Institute for Democracy in 
South Africa, their goal has not been achieved to date.    
 
                                                
195  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others 
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Bearing in mind the findings of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa 
Case201, a member of parliament namely Lance Greyling who represented the 
then Independent Democrats, gave a speech in support of the regulation of 
private funding of political parties.202 The scope of his speech dealt with the 
need for a “Private Members Bill to Regulate Private Political Party 
Funding”203 in South Africa.  
 
In relation to campaigning, just as there is a need for fairness in funding, there 
is also a need for fairness in publicity. In order to regulate private funding, the 
right of access to information in the Constitution may need to be relied upon. 
Presently, the right of access to information and more particularly, the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act204 is being relied on by the 
Independent Newspapers205 in a matter pending in the Western Cape High 
Court.206 With respect to the right of access to information, the Constitution 
provides that “(1) [e]veryone has the right of access to – (a) any information 
held by the state; [as well as] (b) any information that is held by another 
person and that is required for the exercise or protection of any rights”.207 In 
order to exercise the right of access to information, the aggrieved person or 
entity (including for example the media or political parties) may resort to 
review by the courts under PAIA. Similarly “the primary mechanism for 
asserting administrative justice rights is not direct reliance on...” the 
constitutional provision applicable to that right ie section 33 of the 
Constitution, “but through review under” the Promotion of Access to Justice 
Act.208  
                                                
201  Institute for Democracy in South Africa and Others v African National Congress and Others 
2005 (5) SA 39 (C).  
202  “Submission on Private Members Bill to Regulate Private Political Party Funding” available 
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In relation to unfair campaigning, the facts giving rise to the present court 
application that is being opposed by the ANC relates to allegations209 
pertaining to the alleged conduct of an ANC member, Ebrahim Rasool, whilst 
he was employed as the then former Premier of the Western Cape.210 His 
alleged conduct involves the payment to two journalists of the Cape Argus for 
the publication of favourable reports about him in order to “promote the 
‘Rasool faction’ in the party’s regional branch”.211 Possibly, the favourable 
reports published, amounted to the “rubbishing [of] his opponents in the 
Western Cape ANC”.212 According to a court order, the ANC was given an 
opportunity “to file its opposing papers", the Independent Newspapers having 
approached the court for the order when no response was received by the ANC 
in respect of “an application made directly to” the party, in terms of PAIA.213 
The purpose of the court application is “to compel the party to hand over 
documents214 in its possession that relate to [this so called] “brown envelope” 
journalism scandal”.215  
 
The applicability of PAIA to private bodies such as political parties arises 
because the Independent Newspapers with its first application for the request 
of documents from the ANC, “may have relied on the incorrect part of the 
PAIA because the ANC may have contended that it had acted as a private 
body and not a public one”.216 The Independent Newspapers then lodged 
another application in terms of PAIA, on the party, as an attempt to remedy 
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reliance on possibly an incorrect provision of PAIA. As regards the outcome 
of the court application, Griesel J “ordered the ANC to hand over the report of 
its internal inquiry into the ‘brown envelope’ scandal”.217   
 
Also, of relevance to political parties and their campaign right is the 
constitutional provision that the “Bill of Rights ... binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state”.218 The duties of the state with 
regard to party campaigning are twofold. It comprises firstly of the duty of the 
state “to protect the political rights of citizens” and this includes the political 
right of citizens to campaign.219 Secondly, a further duty of the state is to 
protect “parties against [any] interference in their canvassing and campaigning 
activities”.220 Moreover, the Electoral Code provides that “[e]very registered 
party and candidate must publicly state that everyone has the right to lawfully 
erect banners, billboards, placards and posters as well as the right to canvass 
support for a party or candidate”221 and that “[n]o person may unreasonably 
prevent any other person access to voters for the purpose of ... raising funds or 
canvassing support for a party or a candidate”.222 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTORAL LAWS 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter commences with a discussion on the role and nature of the 
Electoral Commission in terms of the Constitution. The applicability of 
national legislation is mentioned in light of constitutional requirements 
pertaining to the formation of the Electoral Commission in South Africa.   The 
constitutional classification of the Electoral Commission as a state institution 
promoting democracy in our constitutional dispensation is then taken into 
account with regard to the objectives of the Electoral Commission Act1.  The 
composition of the Commission as well as the criteria for appointment as a 
Commissioner is referred to, bearing in mind the manner in which the 
Commission performs his or her functions. The role of the Electoral 
Commission as described by the courts is discussed with particular reference 
to the managing role of the Commission. Other functions of the Electoral 
Commission that are applicable to political parties and the electoral process 
are identified in order to clarify the role of the Electoral Commission in our 
Constitutional dispensation. The adjudication of disputes by the Commission 
and recourse to civil proceedings is mentioned.  
 
The discussion on the electoral court commences with the nature and 
composition of the court. The functions of the Electoral court are discussed 
with reference to case law. Cases dealing with political parties and the 
Electoral Commission that was brought before various courts, such as the 
Electoral Court and the Constitutional Court, are assessed in order to clarify 
the role of the Electoral Court. These cases demonstrate, for example, the 
importance of compliance with legislation by political parties. The cases 
further demonstrate the sensitivity of cases of a political nature in that 
                                                
1  Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996, hereinafter “the Electoral Commission Act”. 
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jurisdiction should always be determined with caution and certainty prior to 
litigation. 
  
This chapter deals with the right to free, fair and regular elections in light of 
the constitutional provisions applicable to this right. An explanation of the 
vital role that the Electoral Commission plays in ensuring that the elections are 
free and fair forms a part of the discussion. The importance of electoral 
legislation to ensure free, fair and regular elections is also mentioned below. 
The relationship between the independent nature of the Commission and the 
right to free, fair and regular elections is then assessed. The issues that dealt 
with are whether the principles of co-operative governance are applicable to, 
for example, the Electoral Commission who may find themselves in a dispute 
with the government and determining whether political parties may approach 
the court for relief if the independence of the Electoral Commission is 
undermined.  
 
The right to vote and the right to do so in secret, form an integral part of the 
electoral process.  Concepts such as universal adult suffrage and a voter’s roll 
that are linked to the individual’s right to vote are mentioned with reference to 
the constitutional founding provisions, case law and legislation. A description 
of the right to vote as well as the regulation of this right in accordance with 
legislation is taken into account. A discussion on those entitled and those not 
entitled to register to vote, forms a part of this chapter. The requirements for 
registration as a voter are therefore mentioned. Furthermore, whether the 
limitation of the right to register to vote is justified is taken into consideration. 
Lastly, the option of approaching a court for relief if the right to vote is 
violated forms a part of this discussion.    
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION 
 
The Constitution provides that the “Electoral Commission must be composed 
of at least three persons [and that the] number of members ... must be 
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prescribed by national legislation”.2 The Electoral Commission Act3 provides 
that the “Commission shall consist of five members”.4 This Act stipulates inter 
alia the following criteria for appointment as commissioner namely that “[n]o 
person shall be appointed as a member of the Commission unless he or she- ...  
does not at that stage have a high party-political profile ... and ... has been 
nominated by a committee of the National Assembly, proportionally 
composed of members of all parties represented in that Assembly ...”.5 
Appointed members are prohibited from being nominated or appointed to a 
political office, from supporting or opposing a political party during an 
election and from compromising their independence as a member of the 
Commission by means of their conduct or party membership or party 
association.6 The appointed commissioner is obliged to “serve impartially and 
independently and perform his or her functions as such in good faith and 
without fear, favour or prejudice”7.  At a meeting where the proposed 
discussion is one where a member of the Commission has a conflicting interest 
which might “preclude him or her from performing his or her functions in a 
fair, impartial and proper manner...”8, then he or she should disclose the nature 
thereof.9 Upon disclosing the conflicting interest, the member of the 
Commission may not “be present, cast a vote or in any other manner 
participate in the proceedings...”10 of such a meeting. Furthermore, allegations 
“of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence of a member of the 
                                                
2  Section 191 of the Constitution.  
3  Act 51 of 1996. 
4  Section 6 of the Electoral Commission Act. 
5  Section 6(2) of the Electoral Commission Act.   
6  Section 9(2)(a), (b) and (c) of the Electoral Commission Act provides that “[n]o member of 
the Commission- (a) shall during his or her term of office be eligible for appointment or 
nomination to any political office; (b) may, whether directly or indirectly, in any manner give 
support to, or oppose, any party or candidate participating in an election, or any of the issues 
in contention between parties or candidates; (c) may, by his or her membership, association, 
statement, conduct or in any other manner place in jeopardy his or her perceived 
independence, or in any other manner harm the credibility, impartiality, independence or 
integrity of the Commission...”.  
7  Section 9(1)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act. Section 181(2) of the Constitution.   
8  Section 10 (1) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
9  Section 10(2)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
10  Section 10(1)(a), (b) and (c).  
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Commission”11 may be investigated by the Electoral Court. This court may 
then “make any recommendation to a committee of the National Assembly”.12  
 
With regard to the role of the Electoral Commission, the Constitution provides 
that the “Electoral Commission must – (a) manage elections of national, 
provincial and municipal legislative bodies in accordance with national 
legislation; (b) ensure that those elections are free and fair, and (c) declare the 
results of those elections...”.13 The national legislation giving effect to the 
establishment of the Electoral Commission is the Electoral Commission Act14. 
Thus, the Electoral Commission Act provides that “[t]here is an Electoral 
Commission for the Republic...”.15 The Electoral Commission is regarded as 
one of the “state institutions [that] strengthen constitutional democracy in the 
Republic”.16 The objectives of the Electoral Commission Act17 are therefore 
“to strengthen constitutional democracy and promote democratic electoral 
processes”.18 The Electoral Commission, as a state institution, is “independent, 
and subject only to the constitution and the law, and [it] must be impartial and 
must exercise [its] powers and perform [its] functions without fear, favour or 
prejudice”.19 This constitutional description of the independent and impartial 
nature of the Electoral Commission is confirmed in the Electoral Commission 
Act.20   
 
In the Mketsu Case21 the Electoral Commission was described as “a statutory 
body ... with wide powers in relation to elections, including their 
management”.22 One of the functions of the Electoral Commission is to 
                                                
11  Section 20(7) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Section 190 of the Constitution.   
14  Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 hereinafter referred to as the Electoral Commission Act. 
15  Section 3(1) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
16  Section 181(1) of the Constitution. Section 3(2) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
17  Act 51 of 1996. 
18  Section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act.  
19  Section 181(2) of the Constitution.  
20  Section 3(1) and section 3(2) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
21  Mketsu v African National Congress [ANC] 2003 (2) SA 1 (SCA), 2002 (4) ALL SA 205 
(SCA). 
22  Ibid par 5. 
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“manage any election”.23 The managing role of the Commission was described 
in the New National Party Case24 as one that extends beyond a mere 
supervisory role, as the functions of the Commission “relate to an active, 
involved and detailed management obligation over a wide terrain”.25  
 
Other additional functions of the Electoral Commission that specifically relate 
to political parties are as follows namely, the function of the Electoral 
Commission to “compile and maintain a register of parties...”26 and to 
“establish and maintain liaison and co-operation with parties...”.27 The 
function of the Commission to liaise and co-operate with political parties is 
supported by the Electoral Code of Conduct28. According to the this Code, 
“[e]very registered party and every candidate must- ... establish and maintain 
effective lines of communication with- (i) the Commission; and (ii) other 
registered parties contesting the election...”.29 Registered parties also have a 
duty to ensure that their party representative attends the party liaison 
committee meeting.30 In this regard, the Electoral Code provides that “[e]very 
registered party and every candidate must- ... take all reasonable steps to 
ensure- ... that representatives of that party or candidate attend meetings of any 
party liaison committee or other forum convened by the Commission”.31  
 
If political parties fail to liaise and co-operate as mandated by the Electoral 
Act and the Electoral Code, the Electoral Commission may “adjudicate [such] 
disputes which may arise from the organisation, administration or conducting 
of elections and which are of an administrative nature”.32 Moreover, “the chief 
electoral officer may institute civil proceedings before a court, including the 
                                                
23  Section 5(1)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
24  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC). 
25  Ibid par 76.  
26  Section 5(1)(f) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
27  Section 5(1)(g) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
28  The Electoral Code of Conduct as contained in Schedule 2 of the Electoral Act 78 of 1998 
(hereinafter referred to as the Electoral Code). 
29  Section 7(d) of the Electoral Code. 
30  Section 7(g) (iii) of the Electoral Code.  
31  Ibid. 
32  Section 5(1) (o) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
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Electoral Court, to enforce a provision of this Act33 or the Electoral Code”.34 
The chief electoral officer also has the right to intervene “in any civil 
proceedings if the Commission has a legal interest in the outcome of those 
proceedings”.35  
 
3.3 THE ROLE OF THE ELECTORAL COURT 
 
The Electoral Commission Act36 gives effect to the establishment of an 
Electoral Court, as this Act provides that “[t]here is an Electoral Court for the 
Republic, with the status of the Supreme Court”.37 In the Mketsu Case38, it was 
stated that the Electoral Court “enjoys the status of a High Court”.39 However, 
the “Electoral Court may determine its own practice and procedures and make 
its own rules”40 unlike matters proceeding in the High Court that are regulated 
by the Uniform Rules of Court41. In accordance with the Electoral 
Commission Act, five42 persons are “appointed by the President upon the 
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission”43 to serve as members 
of the Electoral Court.  
 
The functions of the Electoral Court include the power to “review any decision 
of the Commission relating to an electoral matter”44, to “hear and determine an 
appeal against any decision of the Commission only in so far as such decision 
relates to the interpretation of any law or any other matter for which an appeal 
                                                
33  Electoral Act 78 of 1998. 
34  Section 95(1) of the Electoral Act.  
35  Section 95(2) of the Electoral Act.  
36  Act 51 of 1996.  
37  Section 18 of the Electoral Commission Act. Also see G Fick “Elections” in S Woolman, 
Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta 
& Co Ltd, 29-30. 
38  Mketsu v African National Congress [ANC] 2003 (2) SA 1 (SCA), 2002 (4) ALL SA 205 
(SCA). 
39  Ibid par 8. Also section 18 of the Electoral Commission Act states that “[t]here is an Electoral 
Court for the Republic, with the status of the [High] Court”. 
40  Section 20(3) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
41  http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/rules/UniformRulesCourt%5B26jun2009%5D.pdf 
42  Section 19(1 )(a) and section 19(1) (b) of the Electoral Commission Act which provides that 
the “Electoral Court shall consist of the following members ...: (a) A chairperson, who is a 
judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, and two other judges of the Supreme 
Court; and (b) two other members who are South African citizens”. 
43  Section 19(1) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
44  Section 20(1)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
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is provided by law”45 and to “hear and determine any matter that relates to the 
interpretation of any law referred to it by the Commission ...”.46 An example 
where the Electoral Court exercised its power of review is the United 
Democratic Movement Case47.  The provision of the Electoral Act applicable 
to this case is firstly the duty of a “registered party intending to contest an 
election [to] nominate candidates and submit a list or lists of those candidates 
for that election to the chief electoral officer in the prescribed manner”.48 The 
chief electoral officer “notified the applicant, the UDM, that it had not 
complied with section 27(2) (c) and (d) of the Electoral Act49...”.50 These 
sections of the Act provide that the party “list or lists must be accompanied by 
a prescribed − ...acceptance of nomination, signed by each candidate [and an] 
... undertaking signed by each candidate, that that candidate will be bound by 
the Code...”.51 Consequently, the chief electoral officer lodged an objection 
with the Commission in terms of section 30(2)52 of the Electoral Act.53 The 
objection was to the candidates reflected on the UDM’s party list “in respect 
of whom no acceptances [of the nomination] were submitted”.54 The 
Commission upheld the objection. However, the objection was lodged with the 
Commission and served on the applicant, the UDM, two days after the cut-off 
date in terms of the Election Time Table.55 With regard to the cut-off date, the 
Electoral Act provides that the “objection must be made to the Commission ... 
by not later than the relevant date stated in the election timetable...”.56 The 
UDM argued then that the chief electoral officer’s “failure to advise the 
Commission that the objection had been served late renders the Commission’s 
decision subject to review”.57  The Electoral Court, upon review, held that the 
                                                
45  Section 20(2) (a) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
46  Section 20(6) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
47  United Democratic Movement v Electoral Commission 2005 JOL 14188 (ECSA).  
48  Section 27(1) of the Electoral Act.  
49  Electoral Act 73 of 1998.  
50  United Democratic Movement v Electoral Commission 2005 JOL 14188 (ECSA) 1.  
51  Section 27(2)(c) and section 27(2)(d) of the Electoral Act.  
52  Section 30(2) of the Electoral Act which provides that the “objection must be made to the 
Commission in the prescribed manner by not later than the relevant date stated in the election 
timetable, and must be served on the registered party that nominated the candidate”. 
53  United Democratic Movement v Electoral Commission 2005 JOL 14188 (ECSA) 2.  
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid 3. 
56  Section 30(2) of the Electoral Act.  
57  United Democratic Movement v Electoral Commission 2005 JOL 14188 (ECSA) 4. 
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failure of the chief electoral officer “to bring it to the attention of the 
Commission that the objection had been served late had no influence on the 
Commission’s decision, upholding the objection”.58 The application was 
therefore dismissed.59  
 
In the African Christian Democratic Party Case60, “the Electoral Court 
refused to interfere with a decision by the Electoral Commission [of] 
excluding the applicant, the African Christian Democratic Party, from 
contesting the imminent local government elections...”.61 The reason for the 
Electoral Commission’s decision was based on the applicant’s non-compliance 
with section 14(1) (b) and section 17(2) (d) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Electoral Act62. These provisions deal with the requirements 
political parties and ward candidates are to adhere to when contesting 
municipal elections, more specifically, the political party’s obligation to pay 
the prescribed deposit in terms of these provisions of the Act.63  This decision 
of the Electoral Court to refrain from interfering with the Electoral 
Commission’s decision led to an urgent application for leave to appeal against 
the judgment of the Electoral Court.  
 
The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional 
Court had to firstly consider whether it had the “jurisdiction to consider an 
application for leave to appeal against the Electoral Court”.64 Secondly, if the 
Constitutional Court had the necessary jurisdiction to consider “whether the 
                                                
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid 14. 
60  African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 2006 JOL 16810 
(CC). 
61  Ibid par 1. 
62  Act 27 of 2000. 
63  Section 14(1)(b) provides that a “party may contest an election… only if the party by not later 
than a date stated in the timetable for the election has submitted to the office of Commission’s 
local representative … a deposit equal to a prescribed amount, if any, payable by means of a 
bank guaranteed cheque in favour of the Commission”. Furthermore, section 17(2)(d) 
provides that the “following must be attached to a nomination when the nomination is 
submitted to the Commission… a deposit equal to a prescribed amount, if any, payable by 
means of a bank guaranteed cheque in favour of the Commission”. Also see African Christian 
Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 2006 JOL 16810 (CC) par 3. 
64  African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 2006 JOL 16810 
(CC) par 14. 
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Electoral Commission’s decision not to certify the applicant and its candidates, 
effectively disqualifying them from contesting the election… should be 
reviewed and set aside”.65 In considering whether it has jurisdiction to 
consider an application for leave to appeal against the Electoral Court, section 
96 of the Electoral Act was taken into consideration by the Constitutional 
Court. This section provides that the “Electoral Court has final jurisdiction in 
respect of all electoral disputes and complaints about infringements of the 
Code, and no decision or order of the Electoral Court is subject to appeal…”66 
The court noted that the Municipal Electoral Act67 does not contain a similar 
provision and that there is “no provision in the Municipal Electoral Act which 
renders section 96 of the Electoral Act applicable to disputes arising from 
municipal elections”.68 According to O’ Regan J the “Municipal Electoral Act 
does not contain an express provision for an appeal against the decision of the 
Electoral Court… [at the same time] there is also no express provision in the 
Municipal Electoral Act stating that the decision of the Electoral Court is 
final”.69 O’ Regan J further stated that “in the circumstances, it cannot be said 
that section 96 applies to disputes arising from municipal elections and 
accordingly [section 96] cannot on any terms be held to oust the jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court to entertain an appeal...”.70 The Constitutional Court 
concluded that it was in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal but also 
mentioned that this is an exceptional case taking the closeness of the date of 
the election into consideration.71 The municipal election was to be held on the 
1st of March 2006.72 The application was lodged on the 20th February 2006 and 
judgement was granted on the 24th of February 2006.73 The application for 
leave to appeal was therefore upheld and the order of the Electoral Court was 
                                                
65  Ibid par 3. 
66  Section 96(1) of the Electoral Act. Also see African Christian Democratic Party v The 
Electoral Commission and Others 2006 (5) BCLR 579 (SCA) par 14.  
67  Act 27 of 2000.  
68  African Christian Democratic Party v Electoral Commission and Others 2006 JOL 16810 
(CC) par 15. 
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid. 
71  Ibid par 18. 
72  Ibid par 2. 
73  Ibid. 
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set aside74 as the court found that “the applicant had complied with the 
provisions of sections 14 and 17 in respect of the payment of the deposit”.75 
 
In the Mketsu Case76, party members of the African National Congress alleged 
that the selection process for the party list and ward candidates for the 
municipal elections was flawed.77 The matter was brought before the Eastern 
Cape Division of the High Court.78 The respondent, the ANC, argued that the 
High Court lacked jurisdiction.79 The High Court dismissed the application in 
favour of the ANC’s defence.80 The matter was then referred to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. The Court assessed section 65 of the Municipal Electoral 
Act. This section provides that an “interested party may lodge an objection 
concerning any aspect of an election that is material to the declared result of 
the election with the Commission …, by not later than 17:00 on the second 
day after voting day, at its office in Pretoria ...”.81 The Electoral Act contains a 
similar provision.82 Furthermore, according to the Electoral Act, the 
“Commission must decide the objection, and must notify the objector and the 
registered party that nominated the candidate of the decision... [and that the] 
objector, or the registered party who nominated the candidate, may appeal 
against the decision of the Commission to the Electoral Court...”.83 As regards 
the lodgement of the objection in accordance with section 65 of the Municipal 
Electoral Act, the Court confirmed that the objection raised by the party 
members of the ANC, is material to the declared result.84 Hence, section 65 is 
                                                
74  Ibid par37. 
75  Ibid par 34. 
76  Mketsu v African National Congress [ANC] 2003 (2) SA 1 (SCA), 2002 (4) ALL SA 205 
(SCA). 
77  G Fick “Elections” in S Woolman, Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co Ltd, 29-31. 
78  Ibid. 
79  Mketsu v African National Congress [ANC] 2003 (2) SA 1 (SCA), 2002 (4) ALL SA 205 
(SCA) 7. 
80  G Fick “Elections” in S Woolman, Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co Ltd, 29-31. 
81  Section 65 of the Municipal Electoral Act. 
82  Section 30(2) of the Electoral Act which provides that the “objection must be made to the 
Commission in the prescribed manner by not later than the relevant date stated in the election 
timetable, and must be served on the registered party that nominated the candidate”. 
83  Section 30(3) and section 30(4) of the Electoral Act.  
84  Mketsu v African National Congress [ANC] 2003 (2) SA 1 (SCA), 2002 (4) ALL SA 205 
(SCA) 9. 
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applicable to the circumstances surrounding this case.  The court therefore 
considered whether the appellants, Mketsu and others, complied with section 
65 of the Municipal Electoral Act. The Court held that “the procedure set out 
in section 65 of the Municipal Electoral Act is intended to be mandatory and 
that the High Court accordingly has no jurisdiction to entertain objections of 
the kind referred to therein”85 The court found that the appellants, Mketsu and 
others had failed to follow the procedure laid down in section 65 of the 
Municipal Electoral Act.86 Hence, the appeal was dismissed.87 The High Court 
was therefore correct in dismissing the application based on its lack of 
jurisdiction.  
 
3.4 THE RIGHT TO FREE, FAIR AND REGULAR ELECTIONS 
 
The Constitution provides that all citizens have “the right to free, fair and 
regular88 elections …”.89 This right was confirmed in the New National Party 
Case.90 The Constitution further provides that the Electoral Commission plays 
a role in ensuring free and fair elections for all South African citizens.91 In 
order to protect and enforce this constitutional right, the Electoral Commission 
Act92 established the Electoral Commission to inter alia “ensure that any 
election is free and fair [and to] promote conditions conducive to free and fair 
elections...”.93  
 
The Electoral Commission creates “conditions conducive to free and fair 
elections...”94 by managing both, the process of registration, and voting prior 
                                                
85  Ibid 21. 
86  Ibid 4. 
87  Ibid 22. 
88  Section 1(d) of the Constitution which provides that the “Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: …Universal adult suffrage, a 
national common voters roll, regular elections… to ensure accountability, responsiveness and 
openness”.  
89  Section 19(2). 
90  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 12 where it was noted that all South African citizens have a right to free, fair and 
regular elections irrespective of their age.  
91  Section 190(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
92  Act 51 of 1996. 
93  Section 5(1)(b) and section 5(1)(c) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
94  Ibid.  
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to and during the election period.95  The Electoral Commission “may request 
the person who called an election to postpone the voting day for that election, 
provided the Commission is satisfied that the postponement is necessary for 
ensuring a free and fair election”.96  Langa DP stated that the “Commission is 
under a duty to satisfy itself that the elections are free and fair, and to report to 
Parliament if they are not or are likely not to be”.97 According to the 
Constitutional Court, the creation of the Electoral Commission is an essential 
yet not a sufficient ingredient to ensure free and fair elections.98 Therefore, 
Electoral legislation99 also plays a vital role in regulating electoral matters.100 
Furthermore, various provisions101 of the Constitution regulate the regularity 
of elections. These provisions stipulate the term of the national and provincial 
legislature as well as the term of the municipal council.102 Elections in respect 
of the national and provincial legislatures as well as the municipal council 
occur every five years.103   
 
Additionally, the “right to free, fair and regular elections …”104 requires that 
the independence of the Electoral Commission be upheld, failing which an 
infringement of this constitutional right will arise. Indeed, the Commission is 
only in a position to “promote democratic electoral processes”105 such as free, 
fair and regular elections through its “independence”.106  Political parties may 
                                                
95  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 16. 
96  Section 21(1) of the Electoral Act. 
97  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 60. 
98  Ibid 16. 
99  Electoral Act 73 of 1998.  
100  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 16. 
101  Section 49(1), 108(1) and 159 of the Constitution. 
102  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-41. 
103  Section 49(1), 108(1) and 159 of the Constitution. Also P Maduna “Political Rights” in MH 
Cheadle, DM Davis, NRL Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights 
(2005), Second Edition, Lexisnexis Butterworths, 14-5. Also see Section 24 (1) of the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
104  Section 19(2). 
105  Section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act.  
106  Section 181(2) of the Constitution. See also section 3(1) of the Electoral Commission Act.  
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approach a court for relief if either the “right to free, fair and regular elections 
…”107 or the independence of the Electoral Commission is undermined.108  
 
In the New National Party Case109, a political party110 alleged in a High Court 
application, that inter alia, the government interfered with the Electoral 
Commission’s independence.111 The application dealt with issues such as the 
undermining of the Electoral Commission, which (according to the party) 
“might have a bearing on the integrity and fairness of national and provincial 
elections for members of the National Assembly and provincial 
legislatures...”.112 The court dismissed the application113 and this resulted in 
the party applying to the constitutional court for leave to appeal.114 Upon 
considering the application for leave to appeal, the constitutional court took 
cognisance of the importance of “a free, credible and fair election” in South 
Africa.115 According to the constitutional court, “the public importance and 
interest in the matter are of such magnitude that it is manifestly in the interests 
of justice that any [application for leave to appeal instituted by the party] be 
noted directly to this Court”.116     
 
In this case, the Commission advised the government that identity 
documentation other than bar-coded identity documents should be recognised 
as an acceptable form of documentation for the purpose of registration and 
voting.117 The party, in its application to court contended that the government 
                                                
107  Section 19(2). 
108  J Brickhill and R Babiuch “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd 45-38.  
109  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC). 
110  The then existing New National Party.  
111  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 1. J Brickhill and R Babiuch, “Political Rights” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-39. 
112  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 2. 
113  Ibid par 58 where it was stated that the application failed on the basis that the party did not 
make out a case for the relief it sought. 
114 New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) par 1. 
115  Ibid par 2. 
116  Ibid par 6. 
117  Ibid par 55. 
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infringed the independence of the Commission by not accepting the advice of 
the Commission.118 The Constitutional Court noted that the Electoral 
Commission opted to enter into negotiation with the government instead of 
resorting to litigation.119  This analysis of the court reveals that the Electoral 
Commission, by opting to enter into negotiation with the government, asserted 
its independence.120 According to Langa DP, the “Commission is well able to 
protect its own interests and to determine the best way of doing so…”.121  
 
In light of the discussion above, an issue to consider is whether the principles 
of co-operative governance are applicable to, for example, the Electoral 
Commission who may find themselves in a dispute with the government and 
to determine whether political parties may approach the court for relief. Co-
operative governance requires that legal proceedings should be resorted to 
only after all other possible remedies to resolve the dispute have failed.122 In 
this regard, the Constitution provides that an “organ of state involved in an 
intergovernmental dispute must make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that purpose, 
and must exhaust all other remedies before it approaches a court to resolve the 
dispute”.123 The Constitution also provides that “all spheres of government and 
all organs of state within each sphere must co-operate with one another in 
mutual trust and in good faith by … avoiding legal proceedings against one 
another”.124  
 
In the First Certification Judgement Case125 it was held that these 
constitutional provisions126 be read together.127 Although the principles of co-
                                                
118  Ibid. 
119  Ibid par 107. 
120  Ibid. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Section 41(3) of the Constitution. Also see J Brickhill and R Babiuch, “Political Rights” in S 
Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-40. Stu Woolman and T Roux, “Co-Operative Government 
& Intergovernmental Relations” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law 
of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd, 14-7. 
123  Section 41(3) of the Constitution.  
124  Section 41(h)(vi) of the Constitution.  
125  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
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operative governance applies to organs of state,128 in the Langeberg Case129 
the court found that the Electoral Commission did not fall into the category of 
an organ of state in the national sphere of government.130 The reason for the 
courts finding was based on: firstly, the Commission’s exclusion from 
executive authority131, secondly, the Commission as a chapter nine state 
institution132 extends beyond what the concept of national government entails 
and lastly, the independence133 of the Commission which is the opposite of the 
prerequisite of interdependence that applies in instances where the principles 
of co-operative government arises.134 Therefore it is not a requirement for 
chapter nine institutions135 such as the Electoral Commission to adhere to the 
principles of co-operative governance. Disputes involving the Electoral 
Commission and the government or political parties “is not an 
intergovernmental dispute for the purposes of [section] 41(3)”136 of the 
Constitution. In conclusion of the co-operative governance aspect, only if the 
parties before the court can be classified as organs of state in the national 
sphere of government, then the dispute between the parties “should where 
possible be resolved at a political level rather than through adversarial 
litigation”.137 Political parties may therefore approach the court for relief if 
there is a dispute between the Electoral Commission and the government.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
126  Section 41(3) and section 41(h)(vi) of the Constitution.  
127  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re Certification of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) par 291.  
128  Section 41 (1) and section 41 (3) of the Constitution.  
129  Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC), 2001 (9) 
BCLR 883 (CC). 
130  Ibid par 27. 
131  Section 85(2) of the Constitution  
132  Section 181(1)(f) of the Constitution.  
133  Section181(2) of the Constitution.  
134  Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC), 2001 (9) 
BCLR 883 (CC) par 27. See Stu Woolman and T Roux, “Co-Operative Government & 
Intergovernmental Relations” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd 14-13. 
135  Section 181 (1) of the Constitution.  
136  Stu Woolman and T Roux, “Co-Operative Government & Intergovernmental Relations” in S 
Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd 14-13. 
137  Ibid 14-18. Also see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) par 291. Also see Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 
2001 (3) SA 925 (CC), 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) par 30-31. 
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3.5      THE RIGHT TO VOTE  
 
The Constitution provides that the “Republic of South Africa is one, 
sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values ... Universal adult 
suffrage [and] a national common voters roll ...”.138 Universal adult suffrage 
and a national common voters’ roll are therefore listed among the 
constitutional founding provisions.139  “In a country of great disparities of 
wealth and power [this franchise] declares that whoever we are, whether rich 
or poor, exalted or disgraced, we all belong to the same democratic South 
African nation; that our destinies are intertwined in a single interactive [multi-
party] polity”.140 Various other provisions141 of the Constitution support an 
electoral system based on a national common voters roll. Yacoob J confirmed 
that the “existence of, and the proper functioning of a voters roll, is … a 
constitutional requirement integral both to the elections mandated by the 
Constitution and to the right to vote in any of them”.142 In order to give effect 
to these constitutional provisions, the Electoral Act provides that the “chief 
electoral officer must compile and maintain a national common voters’ 
roll”.143  
 
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that every “adult citizen has the right 
to vote in elections ...”144. The constitutional court confirmed that 
“[i]ndispensable to any democratic process is that political parties will ensure 
that their potential supporters are aware of the prerequisites of voting and 
comply with them”145. In the August Case146 the Constitutional Court 
described the vote of citizens as a “badge of dignity and of personhood”.147 
                                                
138  Section 1(d) of the Constitution.  
139  Ibid. 
140  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at par 17. 
141  Section 43(1), section 105(1) and section 157(5) of the Constitution.  
142  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC) at par 13. 
143  Section 5 of the Electoral Act.   
144  Section 19(3) (a) of the Constitution. 
145  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489  
(CC) at par 42.  
146  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC). 
147  Ibid par 17. 
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Cory J stated in the Haig Case148 that the right to vote “is a proud badge of 
freedom”.149 In the New National Party Case150 Yacoob J stated that “the right 
to vote is… indispensable to, and empty without, the right to free and fair 
elections; the latter gives content and meaning to the former”.151 According to 
the Constitutional Court, “the right to free and fair elections underlines the 
importance of the exercise of the right to vote ... each citizen entitled to [vote] 
must not vote more than once in any election; any person not entitled to vote 
must not be permitted to do so. The extent to which these deviations occur will 
have an impact on the fairness of the election”.152 The Electoral Act provides 
that a “voter may only vote once in an election”.153 
 
The Constitution establishes the right to vote but it does not presently establish 
a duty to compel South African citizens (or members of political parties) to 
vote.154 For those who exercise their right to vote, a “form of regulation to 
facilitate the right to vote”155 is necessary. In relation to the regulation of the 
right to vote, in the New National Party Case156 it was stated that in order “to 
exercise the right to vote, Parliament must enact legislation to facilitate its 
exercise”.157 The Electoral Act facilitates the exercise of the right to vote. 
Such facilitation comprises of the establishment of “the date of the election, 
the location of the polling booths, the hours of voting and the determination of 
which documents prospective voters will require in order to register and 
vote…”158 In the August Case, the Constitutional Court mentioned that the 
duties of the executive and the legislature comprise of the promulgation of a 
                                                
148  Haig v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) 1993 105 DLR (4th) 577. 
149  Ibid 613. 
150  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC). 
151  Ibid par 12. 
152  Ibid. 
153  Section 38(1). 
154  Section 19(3) (a) of the Constitution. J Brickhill and R Babiuch, “Political Rights” in S 
Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd 45-46. 
155  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC) at par 123. 
156  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC). 
157  Ibid par 123. 
158  Ibid. 
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date for the elections, securing the secrecy of the ballot and establishing 
machinery such as the Electoral Commission159 to manage the voting 
process.160  
 
In addition, because the right to vote forms a part of our Constitution161, there 
is an obligation on the legislature and the executive to ensure its protection.162 
In South Africa the legislature, executive, the Electoral Commission and 
political parties play a role in protecting and regulating the right of South 
African citizens to vote. Accordingly, the constitutional court provides that:  
 
“[t]here are important safeguards aimed at ensuring appropriate protection for citizens 
who desire to exercise this foundational right [ie the right to vote].  The first of the 
constitutional constraints placed upon Parliament is that there must be a rational 
relationship between the [electoral] scheme which it adopts and the achievement of a 
legitimate governmental purpose.  Parliament cannot act capriciously or arbitrarily.  The 
absence of such a rational connection will result in the measure being unconstitutional.  
An objector who challenges the electoral scheme on these grounds bears the onus of 
establishing the absence of a legitimate government purpose, or the absence of a rational 
relationship between the measure and that purpose”.163  
 
Indeed, the aforementioned safeguards are paramount because Parliament 
determines “the way in which the electoral scheme is to be structured.”164  
With regard to the regulation of the right to vote, political parties and the 
Electoral Commission encourage South African citizens to register as voters 
because the right to vote is “qualified by the requirement that one must be a 
registered voter”.165 Voter, as defined by the Electoral Act comprises of a 
                                                
159  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at par 16. 
160  Ibid. 
161  Section 19(3) (a) of the Constitution. J Brickhill and R Babiuch, “Political Rights” in S 
Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd 45-46. 
162  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) at par 16. 
163  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999 (5) BCLR 489 
(CC) at par 20. 
164  Ibid. 
165  G Fick “Elections” in S Woolman, Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co Ltd, 29-2. 
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South African citizen not younger than 18 years old who is listed on the 
voters’ roll.166  
 
The Electoral Act provides the requirements for registration as a voter.167 
Upon registration, the name of the voter is recorded on the voters’ roll for the 
“voting district in which that person is ordinarily resident”.168 South African 
citizens not younger than 18 years old should ensure that they are registered as 
a voter in order for their name to be listed on the voters’ roll by the 
Commission, failing which such citizen’s will not be permitted to vote at an 
election.169 In terms of the Electoral Act, South African citizens prohibited 
from registering to vote are inter alia those who are of unsound mind or who 
have a mental disorder as declared by the High Court, those who apply for 
registration in a manner other than that prescribed by the Electoral Act and 
those who apply for registration at a voting district other than the district in 
which they are ordinarily resident.170  
 
Furthermore, a citizen who fails to register to vote shall be prohibited from 
voting. In the August Case, Els J in the Transvaal High Court stated that there 
are instances where the conduct of citizens is such that it deprives them of the 
“opportunity to register as a voter or to vote…An example is a person who 
specifically decides not to register because he does not want to vote, also a 
person who is on vacation and decides not to return to his ordinary place of 
                                                
166  Section 1 of the Electoral Act.  
167  Section 8 of the Electoral Act. 
168  Section 8(3) of the Electoral Act. Section 33(1) of the Electoral Act which provides that 
persons may apply to the Commission for a special vote on condition that they fall into the 
category mentioned in the Act such as for example disability or pregnancy. Hence, persons 
who are unable to vote at the voting station in the district where they are ordinarily resident 
and registered as a voter may apply for the special vote if they comply with the provisions of 
the Electoral Act. Failure to adhere to the provisions of the Act could result in a person 
forfeiting his or her right to vote. Also see P Maduna, “Political Rights” in MH Cheadle, DM 
Davis, NRL Haysom (eds) South African Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights (2005), 
Second Edition, Lexisnexis Butterworths, 14-10.  
169  Section 8(1) of the Electoral Act. Section 38(2) of the Electoral Act which provides that “a  
voter may vote at a voting station… if that voter’s name is in the certified segment of the 
voters’ roll for the voting district concerned”.  
170  Section 8(2) of the Electoral Act. Also see J Brickhill and R Babiuch, “Political Rights” in S 
Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second 
Edition, Vol 4, Juta & Co Ltd, 45-49. 
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residence for the purpose of voting”.171 This prohibition of the right to vote is 
justified as it ensues from the conduct of the individual and hence the 
prohibition is self-imposed. The Constitutional Court held that rights may not 
be “limited without justification and legislation dealing with the franchise 
must be interpreted in favour of enfranchisement rather than 
disenfranchisement”.172 According to Maduna, limitations of the right to vote 
due to a person falling into the list of prohibited persons173 as defined by the 
Electoral Act “are self-evidently justifiable and will easily pass muster under 
section 36 of the Constitution, particularly when they are considered in 
relation to constitutional democracies”.174 Any limitation of the right to 
register to vote must comply with the constitutional “limitation clause”.175 
 
Another situation where a citizen may be prohibited to vote is when they do 
not possess the correct documentation.  In the New National Party Case176, the 
“constitutionality of certain provisions of national legislation prescribing the 
documents which otherwise qualified voters must possess in order to register 
as voters and to vote” was challenged by a political party.177 The party argued 
that the Electoral provisions178 that prescribe bar-coded ID’s for registration 
                                                
171  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) par 8. 
172  Ibid par 17. 
173  Section 8(2) of the Electoral Act. 
174  P Maduna “Political Rights” in MH Cheadle, DM Davis, NRL Haysom (eds) South African 
Constitutional Law The Bill of Rights (2005), Second Edition, Lexisnexis Butterworths 14-8.  
175  Section 36 of the Constitution. 
176  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC). 
177  Ibid par 1. 
178  Section 1(xii) provides: 
“‘identity document’ means an identity document issued after 1 July 1986, in terms of section 
8 of the Identification Act, 1986 (Act No. 72 of 1986), or a temporary identity certificate 
issued in terms of the Identification Act, 1997 (Act No. 68 of 1997); (vii)” 
Section 6(2) provides: 
“For the purposes of the general registration of voters contemplated in section 14, an identity 
document includes a temporary certificate in a form which corresponds materially with a form 
prescribed by the Minister of Home Affairs by notice in the Government Gazette and issued by 
the Director-General of Home Affairs to a South African citizen from particulars contained in 
the population register and who has applied for an identity document.” 
Section 38(2) provides: 
“A voter is entitled to vote at a voting station –  
(a) on production of that voter’s identity document to the presiding officer or a voting officer at 
the voting station; and 
(b) if that voter’s name is in the certified segment of the voters’ roll for the voting district 
concerned.” 
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and voting “constitute a denial of the right to vote179 to a substantial number of 
South African citizens” who do not have a bar-coded ID in their possession.180 
The party claimed, in its amended court order, that:   
 
“1. The definition of ‘identity document’ in Section 1 (xii) of the Electoral Act, No 73 of 
1998, is declared unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it excludes those 
documents recognised as identity documents under Section 8(3) of the Identification Act, 
No 72 of 1986. 2. Section 6(2) of the Electoral Act, No 73 of 1998 is declared 
unconstitutional and invalid to the extent that it limits the issue of temporary registration 
certificates to those South African citizens whose particulars are contained in the 
population register and by failing to provide for the issue of temporary registration 
certificates to South African citizens whose particulars are not contained in the 
population register and who have applied for an identity document [and] 3. The invalidity 
of the provisions referred to are suspended pending appropriate amendments which have 
to be effected before ...”181. 
  
The court found that the decision to retain the statutory provisions, which 
determine “the means by which voters must identify themselves”, is in the 
hands of Parliament and not the Commission or court.182  According to 
Yacoob J, statutory provisions will be reviewed by courts “only if they are 
satisfied that the legislation is not rationally connected to a legitimate 
government purpose”.183 The test to determine whether the Electoral Act 
infringe the right of citizens (including members of political parties) to vote, as 
concluded by the constitutional court, is as follows: “the Act would infringe 
the right to vote if it is shown that, as at the date of the adoption of the 
measure, its probable consequence would be that those who want to vote 
would not have been able to do so, even though they acted reasonably in 
pursuit of the right”.184  
 
                                                
179  Section 19(3)(a).  
180  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC) at par 19 and 21. 
181  Ibid par 10. 
182  Ibid par 20, 25 and 60. 
183  Ibid par 25. 
184  Ibid par 24. 
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The evidence before court failed to demonstrate that “the machinery, 
mechanism or process provided for by the Electoral Act is not reasonably 
capable of ensuring that those who want to vote and who take reasonable steps 
in pursuit of the right, are able to exercise it”.185 The constitutional court found 
that firstly, “there is a rational connection between the measure and the 
legitimate governmental purpose of facilitating the effective exercise of the 
important right to vote”186 and secondly persons who wanted to vote were not 
deprived of the right if they reasonably pursed the right.187  As a result, the 
appeal was dismissed.188  
 
Additionally, political parties, their members or any person who undermine 
the right of a person to vote is guilty of an offence.189 In the New National 
Party Case, the nature of the right to vote and the option of approaching a 
court for relief upon violation of the right to vote were taken into consideration 
by the court.  O’ Regan J confirmed that once an “election has been held, it 
will often be too late for a citizen to seek effective constitutional relief to be 
afforded the right to vote, as a court will ordinarily be extremely reluctant to 
overturn an election”.190  
 
Furthermore, the right of prisoners to vote was considered by the 
Constitutional Court in the August Case191. Sachs J confirmed that 
“prisoners… [were] effectively being denied their constitutionally protected 
right to register and vote”.192 The court held that the Electoral Act does not 
exclude prisoners from voting.193 Prisoners are therefore entitled to vote. In the 
Sauve Case it was stated that “incarceration conditions should be made, as far 
                                                
185  Ibid par 38. 
186  Ibid par 49. 
187  Ibid par 24. 
188  Ibid par 50. 
189  Section 97 and 98 of the Electoral Act. 
190  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489 
(CC) at par 125. 
191  August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC).  
192  Ibid par 36. 
193  G Fick “Elections” in S Woolman, Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co Ltd 29-3.  
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as possible, compatible with the fullest possible exercise of the right to vote 
rather than advanced as a reason to deny that right altogether”.194  
 
Lastly, according to the ICCPR, the right to vote is to be exercised by secret 
ballot.195 Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that 
elections “shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting 
procedures”.196 This is in line with the Constitution.197 In South Africa, the 
voting procedure is regulated by the Electoral Act.198 Such procedure 
promotes the preservation of the secrecy of the vote. Persons who are for 
instance blind, may acquire assistance without having the secrecy of their vote 
compromised.199 Also, the Electoral Act provides that “no person may 
interfere with a voter’s right to secrecy while casting a vote”.200 Political 
parties should therefore ensure that their members are aware of the voting 
procedure and that their party abstain from interfering with those exercising 
their right to vote. 
 
3.6   THE RIGHT TO STAND FOR PUBLIC OFFICE  
 
The applicability of the right to stand for public office is clearly defined in the 
Constitution. The persons who are not entitled to this constitutional right 
comprise of a closed list.201 The Constitution provides that every “adult citizen 
has the right to... stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office”.202 
Therefore persons younger than eighteen may not be nominated and elected as 
a member of the National Assembly, the provincial legislature, as well as the 
municipal council.203 The Constitution further provides that certain persons 
                                                
194  Sauve v Canada (Attorney General) 7 or (3rd) 481 (CAO) per Arbour JA at 488. Also see 
August and Another v Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) fn 18.  
195  Article 25.  
196  Article 21.  
197  Section 19(3)(a) of the Constitution. 
198  Section 38 of the Electoral Act.  
199  Section 39 of the Electoral Act.  
200  Section 90 of the Electoral Act. Section 70 of the Electoral Act which protects the right to  
  voter secrecy by requiring that voting compartments be designed in a manner that provides for 
screening of the voter from observers whilst the voter marks the ballot.   
201  Section 19 (3) (b) of the Constitution. Section 47(1)(a) – (e) of the Constitution.  
202  Section 19(3) (b) of the Constitution. 
203  Sections 47 (1), 106 (1), 158 (1) of the Constitution.  
 58 
 
may not stand for public office. These persons include inter alia 
unrehabilitated insolvents, those who are of unsound mind as declared by a 
court order, those who have been convicted of an offence and sentenced to 
more than twelve months imprisonment without the option of a fine, and 
persons who receive remuneration from the state consequent to their 
appointment or service to the state.204 The right to stand for public office may 
also be regulated by legislation. The Electoral Commission Act provides that 
no “member of the Commission shall during his or her term of office be 
eligible for appointment or nomination to any political office”.205  
 
With the Constitution in mind, there is a link between party membership and 
the right to stand for public office because “[a]n individual may become a 
member of the legislature not through any direct choice by the public in 
respect of the individual, but exclusively by virtue of the proportional support 
obtained by the party to which the individual belongs, together with his or her 
position on the ‘party list’”.206 The “composition of the ‘party list’ is an 
entirely domestic affair for any registered party contesting an election”.207 
With reference to party lists, De Vos mentioned that “[a]s we vote for parties 
and not for individual candidates at national and provincial level, the manner 
in which political parties select candidates are crucial for our democracy… 
[and that] a law may help to limit the potential corruption associated with … 
the selection of candidates that will appear on party electoral lists”.208  
 
Party list disputes arise usually prior to local or national elections. In the 
Eastern Cape, for example, members of the ANC lodged a court application 
because, according to them, there was no fairness and transparency with 
regard to the formulation of the “party's candidates list for local government 
                                                
204  Section 47(1)(a), section 47(1)(c), section 47 (1) d), section 47 (1)(e); section 106 (1)(a), 
section 106 (1)(c), section 106 (1)(d), section 106 (1)(e); section 158 (1)(a), section 158 (1)(a), 
section 158 (1)(c), section 158 (1)(d), section 158 (1)(e) of the Constitution.  
205  Section 9(2) (a) of the Electoral Commission Act. 
206  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C) 25. 
207  Ibid 26. 
208  De Vos P, "Political parties must be more open and democratic" retrievable from 
http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/2011/07/14/. 
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elections”.209 The Court application was dismissed.210 ANC spokesman, Brian 
Sokutu, stated that “ANC cadres should have exhausted all the means within 
the party structures to raise their dissatisfaction...”.211 He further stated that the 
ANC is “run by its own constitution” and not by the courts.212 With regard to 
party list disputes, the party leadership has “warned ... that those who [resort] 
to court action would face internal disciplinary action”.213 To avoid these party 
list disputes in South Africa, the adoption of legislation dealing with the 
candidate selection process and the compiling of party lists may be formulated 
by the legislature, provided that the legislation at no time conflicts with the 
Constitution and the constitution of South African parties.  
 
Moreover, as noted above, political parties contest elections.214 According to 
the Democratic Alliance215 constitution, “[o]nly Party members can serve on 
the representative and other structures of the Party and be public 
representatives of the Party”.216 In the Ismail Case217, Binns-Ward AJ referred 
to a political party218 constitution which stated that one of the objectives of the 
party was “to put up candidates for the National Assembly, National Council 
of Provinces and Provincial Parliament and for the election of local 
authorities”.219 In this case, Ismail220, in his capacity “as a representative of the 
party … [occupied] a seat in the Provincial Parliament of the Western 
Cape”.221  As a party member, he was “elected to this position on the basis of 
                                                
209  Gava C, "ANC wins case over local poll candidates list in Eastern Cape" retrievable from 
http://news.za.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=156660183. 
210  Ibid. 
211  Ibid. 
212  Ibid. 
213  “Court dismisses ANC ECape list case” retrievable from 
http://www.timeslive.co.za/Politics/article984198.ece/Court-dismisses-ANC-ECape-list-case. 
214  Rule 3.3 of the ANC Constitution retrievable from http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=207.  
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216  Clause 3.1 of the Democratic Alliance Constitution retrievable from 
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217  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C). 
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Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C) 2. 
219  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C) 1. 
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221  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C) 2. 
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public trust … [and he] represented a constituency, a body, community that 
placed its faith in his credibility…”.222  
 
More particularly, the facts of the Ismail Case as applicable to political parties 
and the constitutional right to stand for public office, is as follows. The party 
charged the applicant with “breach of party discipline and not on the basis of 
his being in breach of parliamentary standing rules or any other code of 
conduct of a public nature”.223 The issue before the court was whether the 
applicant, as a Provincial Parliament representative, was entitled to a public 
disciplinary hearing by the party.224  
 
In respect of section 34 of the Constitution, the court indicated that the 
applicant’s reliance on this constitutional provision was “plainly 
misdirected”.225 This provision provides that “[e]veryone has the right to have 
any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and 
impartial tribunal or forum”.226 Accordingly, Binns-Ward AJ stated that “[i]n 
the absence of express provisions in the domestic constitution it is open to the 
party entitled to convene a private disciplinary enquiry to institute any 
procedure considered appropriate as long as it complies with the rules of 
natural justice. This would include a decision to hold any hearing in 
private”.227 He further contended that “[b]y becoming a member of a private 
body such as … [a political party], the applicant agreed to be bound by its [the 
parties] provisions and to be amenable to the disciplinary processes permitted 
thereunder”.228 As a result, it was held that “[i]t does not matter whether the 
affected member is a parliamentarian or not. The disciplinary proceedings are 
a party matter...”.229 In conclusion, the court dismissed the application.230  
                                                
222  Ibid 6. 
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224  Ibid 8. 
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In summary, party members hold public office as a representative of the party. 
Therefore the party members are not immune to the internal disciplinary 
procedures of the party, which may result in them losing their position. In 
addition, with regard to our electoral system, citizens can be elected to stand 
for public office without being a member of a political party. Indeed, our 
electoral system also permits “independents” to “obtain election to 
parliament”.231    
 
  
                                                
231  Ibid 25. 
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CHAPTER 4 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 
 
4.1     INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter commences with a description of freedom of expression in 
democratic South Africa. The importance of freedom of expression in South 
Africa is such that without it “the ability of citizens to make responsible 
political decisions and to participate effectively in public life would be 
stifled”.1 The relation of the right to freedom of expression with other 
fundamental rights and other constitutional values are taken into consideration 
by analysing various judgments of the Constitutional Court dealing with, for 
example, the status of the right to freedom of expression.  
 
The term “everyone” which forms a part of the freedom of expression 
provision in our Constitution is compared to the term “every person” which 
was the term utilized in the Interim Constitution. The broad interpretation of 
the term “everyone” by the Constitutional Court is taken into consideration 
when determining the applicability of the right to freedom of expression to the 
state or organs of the state as well as to natural and juristic persons. Whether 
the right to freedom of expression is applicable to associations such as 
political parties is determined by assessing the “right to freedom of expression 
clause”2 as well as the “application clause”3 embodied in the Constitution4, 
having reference to both the vertical and the horizontal application of the right 
to freedom of expression in terms of case law. Furthermore, case law dealing 
with the horizontal application of the right of freedom of expression 
simultaneously acknowledging the link between defamation law and the right 
to freedom of expression is mentioned within the context of this chapter. The 
impact of defamation law on the right to freedom of expression is discussed 
                                                
1  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa  2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 21. 
2  Section 16 of the Constituttion. 
3  Section 8 of the Constitution.  
4  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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below, more specifically in the section of this chapter that deals with the 
limitations of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
A discussion on “freedom of the press and other media”5 follows. This 
discussion commences with a description of the media and the obligation it 
has to society in ensuring the protection of the public interest. The link 
between the media and citizens including political parties is discussed with 
reference to the role that the media plays with regard to the engagement of 
political communication in democratic South Africa.  An explanation of the 
nature of the independent regulator, ICASA6, and its mandate “to regulate 
broadcasting in the public interest”7 free from, for example, political control is 
then dealt with. Illustrations of ICASA as a protector and advancer of the right 
to freedom of expression is mentioned with reference to executive control by 
the Minister of Communications and political control by political parties.  
 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Media Appeals Tribunal as a new 
regulatory mechanism for the printed media, as proposed by a political party 
namely the African National Congress, forms a part of the discussion 
encompassing this chapter. A description of media self-regulation is provided 
in order to clarify the concept for the purpose of this discussion. The role of 
the press Ombudsman in guarding against instances where the printed media 
may be subjected to political interference is discussed with the support of non-
interference by political parties expressed in terms of both English as well as 
South African case law. The effectiveness of the Press Council of South Africa 
is then assessed by taking a finding of a British Parliamentary Committee into 
consideration. Adherence to a Code of Conduct and compliance with the 
objectives of the Press Council of South Africa is highlighted as key 
requirements to ensure fairness in the sphere of media self-regulation by a 
South African regulatory body.  The debate on the establishment of the Media 
Appeals Tribunal is ongoing in South Africa and no final decision has to date 
                                                
5  Section 16(1) of the Constitution.  
6  The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa. 
7  Section 192 of the Constitution.  
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been taken as regards the implementation of a new regulatory mechanism for 
the printed media.   
 
A discussion on the freedom to receive or communicate information or ideas, 
as a part of the right to freedom of expression, forms a part of this chapter. 
This discussion highlights the importance of the freedom to receive or 
communicate information or ideas as expressed by the Constitutional Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights. The protection afforded to 
associations such as political parties by the right to freedom of expression and 
its supporting rights, with reference to the communication of information, is 
then taken into consideration. The constitutional mandate of the media which 
supports the freedom to receive information or ideas is referred to within the 
context of this chapter in order to demonstrate that the role of political parties 
and that of the media are intertwined. Furthermore, the freedom to receive 
information and whether it entails a broad enough interpretation which will 
permit the electronic broadcasting of court proceedings is mentioned with 
reference to a particular judgment conferred by the Constitutional Court.  The 
constitutional right of access to the courts, the locus standi of political parties 
and public interest actions is then discussed with reference to a report by the 
South African Law Commission and case law.    
 
The categories of expression that form a part of the right to freedom of 
expression and those that are excluded from the ambit of the freedom of 
expression right is dealt with within the context of this chapter. From this 
explanation stems the identification of the forms of expression that are 
constitutionally protected and those that are not. On this point, the 
Constitutional Court stated that “any expression that is not specifically 
excluded under [section 16(2)] enjoys the protection of the right”.8 This 
chapter furthermore incorporates a discussion on section 16(1) of the 
Constitution, section 16(2) as well as a discussion on the limitations clause 
                                                
8  De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 
(CC) at par 47. Also see Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & 
Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 33. Also see D Milo, G 
Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 42-6. 
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with reference to political parties. Defamation as a limitation to the right to 
freedom of expression forms a part of this chapter. The question whether 
political parties may claim damages for defamation is considered with 
reference to case law.   Thereafter a discussion on the regulation of hate 
speech in South Africa and the effect of the limitations clause on the right to 
freedom of expression follows. This chapter concludes with a practical 
perspective of hate speech bearing reference to case law.  
 
4.2    THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION  IN SOUTH  
 AFRICA 
 
The Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to freedom of 
expression which includes ... freedom of the press and other media [and] 
freedom to receive or impart information or ideas …”.9 What follows now is a 
brief description of the concept freedom of expression in democratic South 
Africa. The Constitutional Court described the right to freedom of expression 
as “the lifeblood of an open and democratic society …”.10 Furthermore, the 
Constitutional Court confirmed that freedom of expression “lies at the heart of 
a democracy”.11 The South African Human Rights Commission concurs with 
the aforementioned descriptions of the Constitutional Court, because the 
Commission in the Freedom Front Case12 states that freedom of expression 
“constitutes one of the essential foundations of any democratic society”.13  
Various international instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights14 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights15 are in 
line with the view as expressed by the Constitutional Court.  
 
                                                
9  Section 16(1) of the Constitution. 
10  Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 (6) SA 235 (CC), 2007 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at par 92. 
11  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC), 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 7. Also see South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) 
SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC) at par 23.  
12  Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 
1283 (SAHRC). 
13  Ibid 1287. Also see Handyside v United Kingdom A.24 (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at par 49. 
14  Article 19. 
15  Ibid. 
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However, in the Khumalo case16, the Constitutional Court stated that 
"although freedom of expression is fundamental to our democratic society, it is 
not a paramount value”.17 According to the Constitutional Court there is a 
relation between the right to freedom of expression and other fundamental 
rights such as, for example, “the right to dignity, as well as the right to 
freedom of association, the right to vote and to stand for public office, and the 
right to assembly”.18 O’Regan J therefore held that freedom of expression lies 
“in one of a ‘web of mutually supporting rights’ in the Constitution”19. Hence, 
freedom of expression “must be construed in the context of the other values 
enshrined in our Constitution”.20 More specifically, these other values enshrined 
in our Constitution inclusive of the aforementioned rights are, for example, the 
“basic values – such as fairness, equality, and respect for individual 
dignity…”.21 Our constitutional dispensation is such that “the values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom attract equal respect and none is, at the level of 
principle, superior to any of the others”.22 The Constitutional Court therefore 
emphasised that the right to freedom of expression “is not a pre-eminent 
freedom ranking above all others… [and that] the right to freedom of 
expression cannot be said automatically to trump the right to human dignity. 
The right to dignity is at least as worthy of protection as the right to freedom 
of expression…”.23 In conclusion of this point, Kriegler J confirmed the 
aforementioned statement of the Constitutional Court when he stated that 
freedom of expression “does not enjoy superior status in our law”.24  
 
                                                
16  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
17  Ibid par 25. 
18  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence & Another 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC), 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 8. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 25. 
21  E Neisser “Hate Speech in the New South Africa: Constitutional Considerations for a Land 
Recovering from Decades of Racial Repression and Violence” (1994) 10 The South African 
Journal on Human Rights 341. 
22  Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 
1283 (SAHRC) 1288. 
23  Ibid. 
24  S v Mamabolo (R TV Business Day and the Freedom of Expression Institutue Intervening) 
2001 (3) SA 409  (CC), 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC), 2001 (1) SACR 686 (CC) at par 41.  
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The term “everyone” in section 16(1) of the Constitution denotes that a wide 
range of persons are entitled to rely on the right to freedom of expression.25 In 
contrast thereto, the term “every person” was the narrower term referred to in 
the Interim Constitution26. In the De Reucke Case27 Langa J emphasized that 
“section 16(1) expressly protects the right to freedom of expression in a 
manner that does not warrant a narrow reading”.28 This broad interpretation by 
the Constitutional Court of the term “everyone” confirms that the right to 
freedom of expression is applicable to “the state or organs of state”29 as well 
as to natural and juristic persons.30 Consequent to the vertical application of 
the right to freedom of expression, natural or juristic persons may assert the 
right to freedom of expression in their relationship with the state or organs of 
state who must guard against any violation of the aforementioned right.31 As 
regards the horizontal application of the right to freedom of expression, for 
example, whether the right to freedom of expression is applicable to 
associations such as political parties, the Interim Constitution ruled out any 
possibility of direct horizontal application of the right to freedom of 
expression.32 However, in the Khumalo case33 the direct horizontal application 
of the right to freedom of expression was not ruled out by the Constitutional 
Court as will be discussed below.  
 
The facts of the Khumalo case34 are as follows. Political party leader 
Bantubonke Harrington Holomisa, the respondent in an application for leave 
to appeal against the dismissal of an exception, sued the applicants’, New 
                                                
25  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-30. 
26  Section 15(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
27  De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 
(CC). 
28  Ibid par 48. 
29  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 33. 
30  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of 
the RSA 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at par 57. D Milo, G 
Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-30. 
31  Section 8(1) of the Constitution. Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 
2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 31.  
32  Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC), 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC). Also see the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
33  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
34  Ibid. 
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Africa Publications Limited and Others for defamation “arising out of the 
publication of an article with their newspaper”.35 According to the applicants’, 
one of the grounds upon which it based its exception to the respondent’s 
particulars of claim was the following: 
 
 “[i]t is inconsistent with [section] 16 of the Constitution to permit a politician, 
alternatively a public official, to recover damages for the publication of a statement 
relating to matters of public interest, alternatively to matters of political importance, 
alternatively to his fitness for public office, in circumstances where he does not allege 
and prove the falsity of the statement in question”.36  
 
From the aforementioned facts it is clear that the “applicants’ exception relies 
directly on section 16 of the Constitution, despite the fact that none of the 
parties to the defamation action is the state, or any organ of state”.37 O’Regan 
J acknowledged the intensity of the right to freedom of expression and having 
regard thereto stated that such intensity “coupled with the potential invasion of 
the right which could be occasioned by persons other than the state or organs 
of state, it is clear that the right to freedom of expression is of direct horizontal 
application [in certain disputes involving only private parties]38 as 
contemplated by section 8(2) of the Constitution”.39 This aforementioned 
constitutional provision provides that various persons other than the state or 
organs of state may rely on the right to freedom of expression including 
associations such as political parties and the media.40 For this reason, in the 
Khumalo Case41, the Constitutional Court considered firstly the fact that “the 
applicants are members of the media who are expressly identified as bearers of 
constitutional rights to freedom of expression [and secondly that there] can be 
no doubt that the law of defamation does affect the right to freedom of 
expression”.42 It therefore follows that presently the direct horizontal 
                                                
35  Ibid par 1.  
36  Ibid par 2. 
37  Ibid par 29. 
38  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-30. 
39  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 33. 
40  Section 8(2) of the Constitution states that a “provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or 
a juristic person  if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the 
right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right”.  
41  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
42  Ibid par 33. 
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application of the right to freedom of expression “will be determined on a case 
by case basis applying the open-ended criteria set out in section 8(2) of the 
Constitution”.43 As regards the effect of defamation law on the right to 
freedom of expression, it is discussed as a part of the limitations of the right to 
freedom of expression forming a part of this chapter. 
 
Freedom of the press and other media which forms a part of the right to 
freedom of expression will now be discussed. The Constitution provides that 
everyone “has the right to freedom of expression which includes freedom of 
the press and other media”.44 The media has been described as “bearers of 
rights and bearers of constitutional obligations in relation to freedom of 
expression”.45 As stated in the Khumalo case46, “the media… rely on freedom 
of expression and must foster it”.47 Furthermore, the media plays a role in 
protecting the public interest as is apparent from the following statement by 
Dean J of the High Court of Australia “the freedom of the citizen [including 
members of political parties] to engage in significant political communication 
and discussion is largely dependent upon the freedom of the media”.48 
Therefore the media should, for example, facilitate ongoing political 
communication between political parties and its members or political parties 
and the public.  
 
                                                
43  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-31. 
Also see section section 8(2) of the Constitution which implies that the right to freedom of 
expression will bind a natural or juristic person if the aforementioned right is applicable to for 
instance, the case at hand, “taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right”.  
44  Section 16(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
45  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 22. 
Also see South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) BCLR 
167 (CC) at par 24. 
46  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
47  Ibid par 22. Also see South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) 
BCLR 167 (CC) at par 24. 
48  Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd and Another (1994) 124 ALR 1 at 61. Also see  
Khumalo and Others v Holomisa  2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 22.  
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During the apartheid era, the broadcaster was subject to state control and this 
entailed “tight political control”.49 In our constitutional dispensation the role of 
the independent regulator or broadcaster, ICASA, comprises of the regulation 
of broadcasting and such regulation does not encompass the regulation of all 
electronic communications, for example, printed media is excluded.50 This 
role of the independent regulator entails both the protection and the 
advancement of the right to freedom of expression as will be illustrated below. 
ICASA ensures that the public interest is upheld in the sphere of 
broadcasting.51 Although it is mandatory for ICASA to consider policy 
directions issued by the Minister of Communications regarding the regulation 
of broadcasting, ICASA is not bound by such directions.52 Furthermore, before 
“a policy direction is made the Minister must consult ICASA, engage in a 
notice and comment procedure in the Government Gazette and refer the 
proposed direction to the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee for comment”.53 
In light of the above, the regulation role of ICASA firstly serves as a 
protection of the right to freedom of expression i.e. protection from, for 
example, interference from executive control. Secondly, the regulation role of 
ICASA supports the advancement of the right to freedom of expression in the 
form of broadcasting as the Constitution makes provision for the 
“broadcasting of views broadly representing South African Society”54 . More 
specifically, the Constitution provides that “legislation must establish an 
independent authority to regulate broadcasting in the public interest, and to 
ensure fairness and a diversity of views broadly representing South African 
                                                
49  J White “Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T 
Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta 
& Co Ltd, 24E-1. 
50  Section 192 of the Constitution states that the role of the independent regulator is to “regulate 
broadcasting in the public interest” and therefore electronic communications that are not 
broadcasted will be excluded from the mandate of the independent regulator. J White 
“Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T Roux, 
M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co 
Ltd 24E-11. 
51  Section 192 of the Constitution. J White “Independent Communications Authority of South 
Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co Ltd 24E-10. 
52  Section 13A(5)(b) of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993. J White 
“Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T Roux, 
M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta & Co 
Ltd 24E-10. 
53  Section 13A(6) of the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993.  
54  Section 192 of the Constitution.  
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society”.55 As stated in chapter 1, the legislation that gives effect to the 
aforementioned constitutional provision is the ICASA Act56.  The importance 
of having an independent regulator such as ICASA is confirmed by the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The Commission passed 
a resolution stating that: 
 
 “broadcasting … must be regulated by a public authority which is independent and 
protected against interference, particularly of a political… nature [and] the appointment 
process in respect of such a body shall be open and transparent with participation by civil 
society and it shall not be controlled by any such political party…”.57  
 
Political parties should not be in a position to exploit the broadcaster to, for 
example, “improve their showing at the polls”.58 Recently in South Africa 
political parties, the government and the media have engaged in debates 
regarding the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal. The debate stems 
from a political party namely the African National Congress which proposed 
that a new regulatory mechanism for the printed media be established on the 
basis that “the Press’s own system of self-regulation has failed”.59 Media self- 
regulation has been described as “a joint endeavour by media professionals to 
set up voluntary guidelines and abide by them …. [and by so doing] the 
independent media accept their share of responsibility for the quality of public 
discourse in the nation, while fully preserving their editorial autonomy in 
shaping it”.60 Moreover, the proposal for the establishment of a new regulatory 
                                                
55  Ibid.  
56   The Independent Communication Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 2000 (‘ICASA Act’) 
and its  predecessor the Independent Broadcasting Authority Act 153 of 1993 (‘IBA Act’). 
57  J White “Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T 
Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta 
& Co Ltd 24E-6. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights “Resolution on the 
Adoption of the Declaration of Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa” available at 
http://www.achpr.org/english/_doc_target/documentation.html?/resolutions/resolutions67_en.
html(accessed on 31 October 2010). Also see Windhoek Charter on Broadcasting in Africa 
(2001) Clause 2, available at https://www.alc.amarc.org/legislaciones/africa.pdf (accessed on 
31 October 2010). 
58  J White “Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)” in S Woolman, T 
Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 2, Juta 
& Co Ltd 24E-3. 
59  “Whats Behind the Media Tribunal Proposal” available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=19509&sn=De
tail (accessed on 29 October 2010). 
60  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe “The Media Self-Regulation 
Guidebook” available at http://www.osce.org/publications/rfm/2008/04/30697_1117_en.pdf 
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mechanism for the printed media was mentioned in the policy document of the 
African National Congress, such policy document being tabled at the parties 
National Policy Conference61. This policy document stated that “an 
investigation should be conducted into: the adequacy or otherwise of the 
prevailing self regulatory dispensation within the media … [and] the need or 
otherwise for a media tribunal to address these matters”.62  
 
The Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa states that 
any “regulatory body established to hear complaints about media content, 
including media councils, shall be protected against political… or any other 
undue interference”.63 In 1996, the press Ombudsman and an Appeal Panel 
was established to provide “accessible, cheap, impartial and independent 
complaints mechanism… as offering solutions through settlement or 
adjudication of complaints in accordance with a Code of Conduct”.64 The 
press Ombudsman also plays a role in, for example, guarding against instances 
where the printed media may be subjected to political influence or intimidation 
from, for example, political parties, political office bearers or government 
officials.65 The English courts have emphasized that “those who hold public 
                                                                                                                                       
(accessed on 31 October 2010). Also see “Whats Behind the Media Tribunal Proposal” 
available  at: 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=19509&sn=De
tail (accessed on 29 October 2010). G Berger stated that “self regulation is a recognition of the 
relative independence of journalists and the media”; See G Berger, “Press self- regulation in 
South Africa: the pudding proved itself”; “The struggle for press self-regulation in 
contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry charade and a government 
doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-berger/2009/09/17/press-self-
regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved-itself.html. 
61  ANC National Policy Conference 27-30 June 2007, Gallagher Estate. 
62  ANC. 2007a. Commission Reports and Draft Resolutions. 06 / Communications and the Battle 
of Ideas. ANC National Policy Conference 27-30 June 2007, Gallagher Estate. http:// 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/2007/conference/communications.html.  G Berger “Press 
self- regulation in South Africa: the pudding proved itself” “The struggle for press self-
regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry charade and a 
government doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-
berger/2009/09/17/press-self-regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved itself.html. 
63  African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, “Declaration of Principles on Freedom 
of Expression in Africa”, Article IX (2) available at 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/africa-declaration-of-principles-on-foe.pdf.  
64  G Berger “Press self- regulation in South Africa: the pudding proved itself”; “The struggle for 
press self-regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry 
charade and a government doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-
berger/2009/09/17/press-self-regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved-itself.html. 
65  This role of the press Ombudsman is essential because it has been stated that “[s]elf-regulation 
for political reasons risks becoming a synonym for self-censorship”. See G Berger, “Press 
self- regulation in South Africa: the pudding proved itself”; “The struggle for press self-
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office in government and who are responsible for public administration must 
always be open to criticism [and] any attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism 
amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable 
kind”.66 Our courts support the aforementioned view of the English courts as is 
evident from the Holomisa Case67. In this aforementioned case it was held that 
“strong and independent newspapers [and] journals …are needed… if 
criticisms [including those of political parties] are to be effectively 
voiced…”.68  
 
In 2007, the “Ombudsman’s position was relocated in [the] re-invented”69 
Press Council of South Africa and Appeals Board.70 The role of the 
aforementioned regulatory body will be considered with reference to the role 
of the British Press Complaints Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the 
PCC”). A British Parliamentary Committee found that the PCC, which is a 
body responsible for media self-regulation, “did not command absolute 
confidence that it was fair…” and there were criticisms with regard to the 
manner in which the PCC applied its own press code.71 The role of the South 
African regulatory body also complies with a Code of Conduct which is 
presently “the basis of the system”72 utilized in South Africa. Furthermore, the 
Constitution of the Press Council of South Africa lists the following as one of 
                                                                                                                                       
regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry charade and a 
government doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-
berger/2009/09/17/press-self-regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved-itself.html. 
66  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-66, 
42-23. Also refer to Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspaper [1992] 3 AA ER 65, 80 
(CA), quoting Hector v Attorney General of Antigua and Barbuda [1990] 2 ALL ER 13, 106. 
67  Holimisa v Argus newspapers Ltd 1996 (2) SA 588, 608-9 (W). 
68  Ibid. Also see D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T 
Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta 
& Co Ltd 42-66, 42-23. 
69  G Berger “Press self- regulation in South Africa: the pudding proved itself”; “The struggle for 
press self-regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry 
charade and a government doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-
berger/2009/09/17/press-self-regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved-itself.html. 
70  Ibid. 
71  “Whats Behind the Media Tribunal Proposal” available at 
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=19509&sn=De
tail (accessed on 29 October 2010). 
72  G Berger “Press self- regulation in South Africa: the pudding proved itself”; “The struggle for 
press self-regulation in contemporary South Africa: charting a course between an industry 
charade and a government doormat” (2009) available at http://nml.ru.ac.za/blog/guy-
berger/2009/09/17/press-self-regulation-south-africa-pudding-proved-itself.html. 
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its objectives namely the promotion and preservation of “the right of freedom 
of expression including freedom of the press as guaranteed in section 16 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa…”73. Therefore the Press Council 
of South Africa is obliged to conduct itself in a manner that achieves the 
aforementioned objective. By doing so the regulatory body shall display 
fairness when addressing complaints from, for example, political parties.   
 
What follows is a discussion on the freedom to receive or communicate 
information which forms a part of the right to freedom of expression. The 
Constitution provides that everyone “has the right to freedom of expression 
which includes … freedom to receive or impart information or ideas…”.74 In 
the South African National Defence Union Case75  the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that the Constitution76 “recognizes that individuals [including 
political parties] in our society need to be able to hear, form and express 
opinions and views freely on a wide range of issues…”.77 The European Court 
of Human Rights78 adopted a broad approach to the freedom to receive or 
communicate information or ideas.79 It held that the right to freedom of 
expression is applicable “not only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, 
but also to those that offend, shock or disturb...”.80 
 
                                                
73  “Constitution of the Press Council” available at 
www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/CI/pdf/South%20%African%20press
%20Council%20Constitution.pdf.  
74  Section 16(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
75  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC), 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC). 
76  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
77  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another 1999 (4) SA 469 
(CC), 1999 (6) BCLR 615 (CC) at par 7. Also see South African Broadcasting Corporation 
Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) 
SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC) at par 23. 
78  Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Also see Handyside v United 
Kingdom (1976) 1 EHRR 737 at 754. Also see Islamic Unity Convention v Independent 
Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 28. 
79  De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 
(CC) at par 49. 
80  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 28. Also see Handyside v United Kingdom (1976) 1 
EHRR 737 at 754. 
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In South Africa, the right to freedom of expression together with the other 
fundamental rights it supports (as discussed above) protects “the right of 
individuals not only individually to form and express opinions, of whatever 
nature, but to establish associations and groups of like-minded people to foster 
and propagate such opinions”.81 For example, this occurs when individuals 
form a political party and the media is called upon by the political party to 
propagate the manifesto of the party. As stated in the Khumalo Case82, “[a]s 
primary agents of the dissemination of information and ideas, [the media] are, 
inevitably, extremely powerful institutions in a democracy and they have a 
constitutional duty to act with vigour, courage, integrity and 
responsibility….”.83 Furthermore, this protection afforded by the right to 
freedom of expression and its supporting rights “enables citizens [and political 
parties], and particularly the media, to communicate information and ideas to 
the community and thus contributes to the creation and maintenance of an 
informed electorate, so that they can better participate in the democratic 
process”.84  
 
The media has an obligation, more importantly a constitutional mandate “to 
provide citizens [including political parties] both with information and with a 
platform for the exchange of ideas”.85 For example, political parties during 
campaigns express their right to freedom of expression when they 
communicate information to the public and when they receive information 
from the public. This retrieved information is then broadcast by the media in 
accordance with their constitutional mandate which supports the freedom to 
receive information or ideas.86 In this regard the role of the media and that of 
political parties are intertwined.  Mokgoro J stated as regards the importance 
of the right to receive information: “my freedom of expression is impoverished 
                                                
81  Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 
1283 SAHRC 1287. 
82  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC). 
83  Ibid par 24. 
84  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-24. 
85  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 24. 
86  South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC) at par 24 
where it is stated that the “media are key agents in ensuring that … the right to freedom 
of information are respected”.  
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indeed if it does not embrace also my right to receive, hold and consume 
expressions transmitted by others… a law which deprives willing persons of 
the right to be exposed to the expression of others gravely offends 
constitutionally protected freedoms both of the speaker and the would-be 
recipients”.87  
 
Unlike the Interim Constitution88 which did not include as a part of the right to 
freedom of expression, the freedom to receive information, the Constitution 
guarantees both the right to communicate and receive information.89 Hence the 
content of the provision of freedom of expression as contained in the Interim 
Constitution was not as wide as that of our Constitution. Regarding the right to 
communicate and receive information, in the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation Case90 one of the questions before the Constitutional Court was 
“whether the ambit of section 16 of our Constitution does extend to confer a 
right on the applicant [the South African Broadcasting Corporation] to televise 
court proceedings”.91 The court opted not to deal with the question, as the 
nature of the matter was urgent, yet the court did not fail to “assume in favour 
of the applicant that there is such a right”.92 However, in the aforementioned 
case, the importance of access to the courts93 was considered by the 
Constitutional Court to be of greater importance than the right of the media to 
communicate and receive information via electronic broadcasting.94  
 
In light of the above and in order to clarify the constitutional right of access to 
the courts with regard to the locus standi of political parties in respect of, for 
                                                
87  Case and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others; Curtis v Miinister of Safety & 
Security and Others 1996 (3) SA 617 (CC); 1996 (5) BCLR 609 at par 92. Also see D Milo, G 
Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-32.  
88  Section 15.  
89  Section 16(1) of the Constitution. Also see De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 
(1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 (CC) at par 49. Also see D Milo, G Penfold and A 
Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of 
South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-66, 42-32.  
90  South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and 
Others 2007 (1) SA 523 (CC), 2007 (1) SACR 408 (CC), 2007 (2) BCLR 167 (CC). 
91  Ibid par 25. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Section 34 of the Constitution.  
94  D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop 
(eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 42-33.  
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example, public interest actions, a discussion on such constitutional 
“enforcement of rights”95 follows. According to the Constitution: 
 
 “[a]nyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach the 
court are - ... (d) anyone [including political parties] acting in the public interest; and (e) 
an association [including political parties] acting in the interest of its members”.96  
 
The South African Law Commission, in terms of its Report on the Recognition 
of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law, emphasised 
the need for legislation regulating public interest actions and class actions in 
South African law.97 The draft bill namely “Public Interest and Class Actions 
Act”98 has been published by the South African Law Commission although 
Parliament has to date not promulgated the draft bill.99 There are presently no 
procedural rules governing class or group actions in South Africa and in the 
absence of the aforementioned procedural rules, the applicability of the High 
Court Rules of South Africa100 reign in the sphere of class or group actions 
coupled with the discretion of the judiciary on a case by case basis.101  
                                                
95  Section 38 of the Constitution.  
96  Ibid. Section 7(4) of the interim Constitution.  
97  South African Law Commission, “The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law” at 34 available at 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj88_classact_1998aug.pdf. Also see 
“Constitutional Practice Class Actions And Public Interest Actions” available at 
www.judicialeducation.org.za/files/MagCourts/CIV%20MAG%2017%20Class%20Actions%
20and%20Public%20Interest%20Actions.pdf. 
98  South African Law Commission, “The Recognition of Class Actions and Public Interest 
Actions in South African Law” available at 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj88_classact_1998aug.pdf. 
99  The daft bill was published in 1998. See South African Law Commission, “The Recognition 
of Class Actions and Public Interest Actions in South African Law” at 87 available at 
http://salawreform.justice.gov.za/reports/r_prj88_classact_1998aug.pdf. See also P Conradie 
“The International Comparative Legal Guide to: Class and Group Actions 2010” available at 
www.cliffedekkerhofmeyer.com/news/files/CDH-Class-and-Group-Actions-South -
Africs.pdf.  
100  Uniform Rule of Court 16A which provides that: “[s]ubject to the provisions of national 
legislation enacted in accordance with section 171 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (Act No. 108 of 1996), and these rules, any interested party in a constitutional 
issue raised in proceedings before a court may, with written consent of all the parties to the 
proceedings... be admitted therein as amicus curiae upon such terms and conditions as may be 
agreed upon in writing by the parties.” 
101  Rates Action Group v City of Cape Town 2004 (5) SA 545 (C) at para 22. In this 
aforementioned case, the interests of justice was considered sufficient ground for the court “to 
relax the statutory requirements of Rule 16A”. Also see P Conradie “The International 
Comparative Legal Guide to: Class and Group Actions 2010” retrieved from 
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The Glenister Case102, a High Court matter which was found to be within the 
“Constitutional Courts jurisdiction”103 as will be mentioned below, 
demonstrates an example of the constitutional right of access to the courts, 
more specifically the locus standi of political parties in terms of section 38 of 
the Constitution. In this aforementioned case, the following political parties 
namely the “African Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Alliance, the 
Independent Democrats, the United Democratic Movement and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party ... applied in terms of rule 16A of the Uniform Rules of Court 
for ... [l]eave to be admitted in the proceedings as amicii curiae...”.104 Van Der 
Merwe J stated that “the political parties had shown that they indeed have an 
interest in the outcome of [the High Court] application [and] that their 
submissions would be relevant ...”105. The facts and the outcome of the 
Glenister106 High Court case and the Constitutional Court case, as applicable 
to political parties who were admitted in the aforementioned court proceedings 
as amicii curiae acting in the public interest, is discussed below.  
 
The Glenister High Court Case107 dealt with “the question of the 
disestablishment of the Directorate of Special Operations established in terms 
of section 7(1) (a) of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998”108 
                                                                                                                                       
www.cliffedekkerhofmeyer.com/news/files/CDH-Class-and-Group-Actions-South -
Africs.pdf. Also see “Constitutional Practice Class Actions And Public Interest Actions” 
available at 
www.judicialeducation.org.za/files/MagCourts/CIV%20MAG%2017%20Class%20Actions%
20and%20Public%20Interest%20Actions.pdf.  
102  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf. See also Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) 
SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008).  
103  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 41. 
104  Ibid 4. See also Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) 
[2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) 5.  
105  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 4. 
106  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf. Also see Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) 
SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008). 
107  Ibid. 
108  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 37.  Also see Glenister v 
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and the initiation of legislation by the First, Second and Third Respondents’109 
to give effect to the aforesaid disestablishment of the Directorate of Special 
Operations.110 The Applicant, Glenister, in the said application sought to 
interdict or restrict the initiation of such legislation.111 According to Van Der 
Merwe J “this matter involves crucial and important political matters in which 
a High Court has no jurisdiction but only the Constitutional Court”.112 He 
furthermore stated that the High Court “has no jurisdiction to interfere with the 
executive powers of the President and Cabinet or with the process in 
Parliament”.113  
 
The above decision of the High Court led to the Applicant approaching the 
Constitutional Court firstly for leave to appeal and secondly for direct access 
thereby seeking the following order namely: 
 
     “an order: (1) declaring that the decision taken by Cabinet on or about 30 April 2008 to 
initiate legislation disestablishing the DSO …is unconstitutional and invalid; and (2) 
directing the relevant ministers to withdraw the National Prosecuting Authority 
Amendment Bill of 2008 (NPAA Bill) and the South African Police Service Amendment 
Bill of 2008 (SAPSA Bill) … from the National Assembly”.114  
 
The United Democratic Movement, a political party admitted to the court 
proceedings as amicii curiae acting in the public interest, argued that “because 
the decision to initiate the legislation arose as a result of the Polokwane 
                                                                                                                                       
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) 
SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) 3. 
109  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 
19; 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) wherein the First 
Respondent is the President of the Republic of South Africa, the Second Respondent is the 
Minister of Safety and Security and the Third Respondent is the Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development. 
110  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 
19; 2009 (1) SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) 3. 
111  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 2. See also Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) 
SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) 3. 
112  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 41. See also Glenister v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 41/08) [2008] ZACC 19; 2009 (1) 
SA 287 (CC); 2009 (2) BCLR 136 (CC) (22 October 2008) 3. 
113  Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others2008 (Unreportable), 
available at http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/2008/143.pdf at 40.  
114  Ibid 3 and 4. 
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Resolution, Cabinet acted under dictation in making the decision to initiate the 
legislation to disestablish the DSO. [The party suggested] further that the 
executive followed the dictates of the ruling party rather than its 
responsibilities in terms of the Constitution”115. Langa J expressed the view 
that “there is nothing wrong, in our multi-party democracy, with Cabinet 
seeking to give effect to the policy of the ruling party. Quite clearly, in so 
doing, Cabinet must observe its constitutional obligations and may not breach 
the Constitution”116.  In conclusion, the Constitutional Court refused both the 
Applicants application for leave to appeal and for direct access, the court 
expressing the view that it was not in the interest of justice to grant such an 
application.117 According to Langa J, “the applicant has not established that it 
is appropriate for the [Constitutional] Court to intervene in the affairs of 
Parliament in this case [and the applicant] has not shown that material and 
irreversible harm will result if the Court does not intervene”.118 
 
4.3  FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
 
The right to freedom of expression consists of categories of expression that 
form a part of the right to freedom of expression and categories of expression 
that are excluded from the ambit of the freedom of expression right.119 This 
distinction is relevant firstly because the section 16(1)120 categories of 
expression have the benefit of constitutional protection whereas the section 
16(2)121 categories of expression do not.122 Secondly, the section 36123 
limitations clause is applicable only to categories of expression that are 
constitutionally protected.124  Hence the importance of determining the 
                                                
115  Ibid 31. 
116  Ibid. 
117  Ibid 32. 
118  Ibid. 
119  Section 16(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution. 
120  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
121  Ibid. 
122  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 33. L Johannessen “A Critical View of the 
Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 The South African Journal on Human 
Rights 138. 
123  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
124  L Johannessen “A Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 
The South African Journal on Human Rights 139-140. 
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parameters of the right to freedom of expression cannot be overlooked.125  The 
discussion that follows will therefore deal with the aforementioned 
constitutional provisions bearing reference to the parameters of the right to 
freedom of expression and political parties.  
 
Section 16(1) of the Constitution comprises of an open list because the 
Constitutional Court places emphasis on a broad interpretation of the right.126 
As stated above, in the De Reuck Case127 Langa J stated that “section 16(1) 
expressly protects the freedom of expression in a manner that does not warrant 
a narrow reading”.128  Therefore all forms of expression fall within the 
constitutional protection ambit provided by section 16(1) of the Constitution 
except those forms of expression specifically mentioned and excluded by the 
provisions of section 16(2) of the Constitution.129  
 
The freedom of expression provision as it stood in the Interim Constitution130 
did not include section 16(2) of the Constitution.131 The political party, the 
African National Congress, in support of the inclusion of section 16(2) in the 
Constitution132 submitted the following recommendation to the Committee 
who was responsible for the drafting of the freedom of expression provision 
namely “it is advisable that the right [to freedom of expression] should be 
reformulated to provide constitutional protection from racist, sexist or hate 
speech calculated to cause hostility and acrimony, and, racial, ethnic or even 
religious antagonism and division”.133 Therefore, the Constitution134 identifies 
                                                
125  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 30. 
126  De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 
(CC) at par 48. 
127  De Reucke v Director of Public Prosecutions 2004 (1) SA 406 (CC), 2003 (12) BCLR 1333 
(CC). 
128  Ibid par 48. Section 16(1) of the Constitution. 
129  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 32. See D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of 
Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 
(2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd, 42-7. 
130  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. 
131  Section 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. L Johannessen “A 
Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 The South African 
Journal on Human Rights 135. 
132  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
133  L Johannessen “A Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 
The South African Journal on Human Rights 137. 
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“advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and 
that constitutes incitement to cause harm” as forms of expression that fall 
beyond the constitutionally protected categories of expression.135 For this 
reason, Langa J describes section 16(2) as definitional because it “defines the 
boundaries beyond which the right to freedom of expression does not 
extend”.136  
 
Moreover, section 16(2) of the Constitution has been described as an “internal 
limitation to the general right to freedom of expression [contained] in section 
16(1) of the Constitution”.137 The United Nations Special Rapporteurs on 
freedom of opinion and expression stated that “[r]estrictions of the right to 
freedom of expression may be so broad in scope or drafted in such terms as to 
put the right itself in jeopardy…”138. Furthermore, it has been stated that an 
internal limitation of the right to freedom of expression is not recommendable, 
the reason being that the “internal limitation removes an entire area of speech 
beyond the ambit of the right to freedom of expression and consequently from 
the ambit of constitutional protection”.139 According to Langa J, the provisions 
of section 16(2) of the Constitution acknowledges that “certain expression 
does not deserve constitutional protection because, among other things, it has 
the potential to impinge adversely on the dignity of others and cause 
harm…”.140  In light of the aforementioned contrasting views, it therefore 
                                                                                                                                       
134  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
135  Section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. Also see Islamic Unity Convention v Independent 
Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 (CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 31. 
Also see D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, T Roux, M 
Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, Juta & Co Ltd 
42-6 and 42-7 where it was stated that (a) the text of section 16(2) “imply that the categories 
of expression as enumerated in [section 16(2) of the Constitution] are not to be regarded as 
constitutionally protected speech” and (b) that these “… categorical exclusions in the 
constitutional text [comprise of] a closed list”.  
136  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 32. 
137  L Johannessen “A Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 
The South African Journal on Human Rights 138. 
138  The Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression – Final Report by Mr Danilo Turk and Mr 
Louis Joinet, Special Rapporteurs, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/9,14 July 1992. Also see L 
Johannessen “A Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 
The South African Journal on Human Rights 144. 
139  L Johannessen “A Critical View of the Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 
The South African Journal on Human Rights 136.  
140  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC) 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 32. 
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follows that whether or not section 16(2) is a necessary provision in the 
Constitution is a matter that may be further debated, taking factors such as, for 
example, “the right to human dignity”141 and defamation law into 
consideration. According to Kriegler J “the right to freedom of expression 
cannot be said automatically to trump the right to human dignity. The right to 
dignity is at least as worthy of protection as the right to freedom of 
expression…”.142 Furthermore, in the Khumalo Case O’ Regan J stated that 
“the law of defamation lies at the intersection of the freedom of speech and the 
protection of reputation or good name”.143 Hence, there is a profound link 
between the right to dignity, defamation law and the right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
A discussion on defamation as a limitation of the right to freedom of 
expression as applicable to political parties now follows. According to Corbett 
J: 
 
     “it is trite that [freedom of expression] is not, and cannot be permitted to be, totally 
unrestrained. The law does not allow the unjustified savaging of an individual’s 
reputation. The right of free expression enjoyed by all persons, including the press [and 
political parties], must yield to the individual’s right, which is just as important, not to be 
unlawfully defamed”.144  
 
Defamation law seeks to achieve namely the protection of “the reputations of 
individuals – or of entities with the right to sue and be sued – against 
injury…”145. As stated in the Argus Case146, the “traditional standard for 
determining whether utterances are defamatory is whether the imputation 
                                                
141  Section 10 of the Constitution.  
142  S v Mamabolo 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC) -Ed, 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at 429.  
143  Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 26. 
Also see Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 
579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 15, a case that required “the balancing of two different and 
competing values which our law seeks to protect - on the one hand, freedom of speech, and, on the 
other, the safeguarding of reputations against unjustified attack”. 
144  Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v Esselen’s Estate 1994 (2) SA 1 (A) at 25 B-E. See 
also Khumalo and Others v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC), 2002 (8) BCLR 771 (CC) at par 
26. 
145  Defining Defamation, “Principles on Freedom of Expression and Reputation, Article 19 
Principle 2(a), July (2000) available at 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf.  
146  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A). 
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conveyed ... lowers the plaintiff in the estimation of right - thinking persons 
generally”.147  
 
Whether public bodies such as political parties or government may rely on 
defamation law was considered by the Global Campaign for Free Expression 
i.e. Article 19148. This Campaign stated that “[p]ublic bodies of all kinds 
[including political parties]...should be prohibited altogether from bringing 
defamation actions”.149 The reason being that such exclusion is attributed to 
“the vital importance in a democracy of open criticism of government and 
public authorities, the limited and public nature of any reputation these bodies 
have, and the ample means available to public authorities to defend themselves 
from criticism”.150 Presently, the position in South Africa differs from the 
position adopted by the aforementioned Campaign as will be explained with 
reference to case law. The Argus Case151 commenced with the issuing of 
summons in the then called “Witwatersrand Local Division” by the Inkatha 
Freedom Party, a political party claiming “damages in respect of defamatory 
statements alleged to have been published in two articles in the Sowetan, a 
newspaper of which [Argus Printing and Publishing Company Limited] was the 
proprietor, publisher and printer”.152 The parties to the action agreed that the issue 
for adjudication was the following namely: 
 
“in as much as Inkatha is a non-trading corporation153 (a universitas capable of suing and being 
sued in its own name) ... which depends on financial support from the public, ... whether Inkatha, 
as such a body, has the right to claim damages for defamation in respect of the articles complained 
                                                
147  Ibid 22. 
148  Defining Defamation, “Principles on Freedom of Expression and Reputation, Article 19, July 
(2000) available at http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf.  
149  Defining Defamation, “Principles on Freedom of Expression and Reputation, Article 19 
Principle 3, July (2000) available at 
http://www.article19.org/pdfs/standards/definingdefamation.pdf. 
150  Ibid. Also see Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) 
SA 579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 21 wherein one of the “reasons advanced for denying a 
political body the right to sue for defamation” was the fact that “people should not be restrained in their 
political utterances by the fear of being subjected to claims for defamation”.  
151  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A). 
152  Ibid 3.  
153  GA. Fichardt Ltd. v. The Friend Newspapers Ltd 1916 AD 1 953 I-954 E where it was held that “a 
non-trading corporation can sue for defamation if a defamatory statement concerning the way it 
conducts its affairs is calculated to cause it financial prejudice”. See also Argus Printing and 
Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 
185 (A) 10. 
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of, assuming those articles, for the purposes of argument, to be defamatory in the manner alleged 
by the plaintiff, and assuming further that the articles were calculated to cause financial prejudice in 
the nature of loss of membership dues and donations”.154  
 
The court a quo Judge, namely Stegmann J held that Argus Printing and 
Publishing Company Limited was liable to make payment to Inkatha Freedom 
Party in respect of damages for defamation.155 According to the court a quo there 
“are no considerations of legal or public policy which deprive juristic persons which 
are or which resemble political parties of the ordinary remedy for defamation”.156 
Argus Printing and Publish Co Ltd then “applied to the trial judge for leave to 
appeal, which was duly granted”.157 Therefore, in the Argus Case158 the then 
called “Appellate Division” was tasked with determining “whether it would be 
in the public interest to permit attacks on political bodies, whose policies and 
actions are normally matters for debate on public and political platforms, to be 
made the basis of claims for damages in courts of law”159, more specifically 
“whether this Court should, on the grounds of public or legal policy, hold that a 
political body is not entitled to sue for defamation calculated to cause it financial 
loss”.160 In the aforementioned case the “ground of public policy mainly relied 
                                                
154  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 4. 
155  Ibid 6. 
156  Ibid. See also Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) 
SA 579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 12 which mentions as an exception to the general rule 
that a non-trading corporation may sue for defamation, Rabie ACJ’s finding that “certain 
corporations may be denied the right to sue for defamation on the ground of considerations of public or 
legal policy” as stated in  Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1989 (1) SA  945 
(A) . 
157  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 6. 
158  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A). 
159  Ibid 2. See Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1989 (1) SA 945 (A) 954 G which 
gave rise to the abovementioned legal question being dealt with in the Argus printing Case.  
160  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 13. Also see Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha 
Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 25 where it was stated that 
“[e]ven  if utterances during political debate can be regarded as prima facie defamatory, the defendant 
would have available to him a number of defences. The most important ones for present purposes are 
those of fair comment, justification (truth and public benefit) and privilege. The effect of these defences 
is to exclude unlawfulness - in other words, to render lawful the conduct of the defendant in publishing 
matter which is prima facie defamatory”. Also see Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v 
Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 26 wherein it was 
mentioned that the boundaries of these aformentioned defences  is “determined by the application of 
the general criterion of reasonableness” and these criterion rely on “considerations of public and legal 
policy”. Also see section 58 of the Constitution which deals with the nature of  the privilege ie the 
freedom of speech afforded to members of the National Assembly. For further information on the 
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upon by the appellant, [Argus Printing and Publish Co Ltd, was] the need to foster 
and protect freedom of expression.”161 According to Grosskopf J: 
 
 “the promotion and defence of this facet of public policy [relied upon by the appellent, does] not 
... require that any class of person should be prevented from bringing proceedings for defamation 
[because where] a right to sue exists, the law of defamation itself  recognizes the importance of 
freedom  of political expression, and makes provision for  it”.162 
 
It was held that “no good reason has been shown for excluding political 
bodies163 from the class of non-trading corporations, which according to the 
Natal Newspapers case164, are entitled to sue for damages for defamation”.165 
Grosskopf J confirmed that “there can ... be no suggestion that a political 
body’s reputation is necessarily so robust and universal as to be invulnerable 
to defamatory attacks”.166   
 
The arguments raised in the aforementioned case should be re-visited in order 
to more fully assess the present position of political parties in South Africa 
with regard to defamation law and more particularly in light of the following 
unanswered question namely, “whether the association between the ruling 
party and the Government should lead to the denial of the right of the party to 
sue for damages for defamation, either generally or in particular cases where 
its position can be assimilated to that of the Government.”167  Although Argus 
                                                                                                                                       
aspect of privelege refer to 
http://www.publiclaw.uct.ac.za/usr/public_law/Building/Chapter%203.pdf as scu discussion is 
not specifically applicable to political parties and hence extends beyond the scope of this 
dissertation.  
161  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL       SA 185 (A) 13 & 63. 
162  Ibid 63. 
163  In Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 
(AD); 1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 21, Grosskopf J stated that it would be “completely unrealistic to 
distinguish in the present context between political bodies which propose candidates for election and 
those which do not. It is a matter of common knowledge that some major political organizations in this 
country have never proposed candidates for election, and  in fact do not regard themselves as political 
parties at all, but rather as liberation movements or something similar. Public policy does not, to my 
mind, require that they should enjoy greater freedom from attack than bodies which fight elections. 
There is consequently no basis in logic upon which we could lay down a rule which would apply only 
to political parties”. 
164  Dhlomo NO v. Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd and Another 1989 (1) SA  945 (A). 
165  Argus Printing and Publishing Company Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 579 (AD); 
1992 2 ALL SA 185 (A) 64. 
166  Ibid 55. 
167  Ibid 62. 
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Printing and Publish Co Ltd (the appellant) put to the court that “even where 
the defamation applies only to the party and not to the State, the right to 
criticise and attack the ruling party is of great importance and should be 
allowed unfettered by any fear of defamation actions”168, the court opted not to 
deal with this point because it fell out of the fold of the legal question that was 
to be determined by the court.169  
 
A discussion on the regulation of hate speech coupled with section 36 (1) of 
the Constitution follows. In South Africa “where racial violence has been 
prevalent and racial insult will… often be seen as physically threatening, the 
societal interests in … destabilizing [the] impact of violence are plainly 
applicable in considering whether to regulate hate speech”.170  According to 
Langa J, “[t]here is no doubt that the state has a particular interest in regulating 
[hate speech] because of the harm it may pose to the constitutionally mandated 
objective of building the non-racial and non-sexist society based on human 
dignity and the achievement of equality. There is accordingly no bar to the 
enactment of legislation that prohibits such expression”.171 Presently no such 
legislation has been formulated for the regulation of hate speech in South 
Africa. The South African Human Rights commission confirmed that only: 
 
“expression falling within the categories listed in section 16(2) cease to be protected. The 
implication of it not being protected is that once expression is deemed to be, for instance, 
hate speech, it may be regulated or totally proscribed by the State, provided that it is 
rational to do so. The State, in this instance, does not have to justify the limitation in 
terms of the limitation clause, as such regulation or proscription would not amount to an 
infringement of a constitutionally protected right. Thus, the finding that any particular 
expression amounts to hate speech would in most instances be determinative of the 
constitutional enquiry...”172.  
 
                                                
168  Ibid 59. 
169  Ibid 60. 
170  E Neisser “Hate Speech in the new South Africa: Constitutional considerations for a land 
recovering from decades of racial repression and violence” (1994) Vol 10 The South African 
Journal on Human Rights 343.  
171  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 33. 
172  Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 
               2003 (11) BCLR 1283 (SAHRC) 1289.  
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Therefore “once expression is deemed to be hate speech, no further 
justification is required from the State for its regulation or prohibition”.173 
 
With regard to the limitation clause, the Constitution provides that the “rights 
in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors…”174. Langa J confirmed that the right to freedom 
of expression is “not absolute; it is, like other rights, subject to limitation under 
section 36(1) of the Constitution”.175  In the Islamic Unity Case176 the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that the limitation of any of the section 16(1) 
constitutionally protected categories of expression “must satisfy the 
requirements of the limitations clause to be constitutionally valid”.177 
Therefore where “the state extends the scope of regulation [as mentioned 
above] beyond expression envisaged in section 16(2), it encroaches on the 
terrain of protected expression and can do so only if such regulation meets the 
justification criteria in section 36(1) of the Constitution”.178 
 
A more practical perspective of hate speech follows. Hate speech comes into 
play when, for example, members of political parties’ utter comments viewed 
by for instance opposing political parties or the public at large as being racist 
especially if such utterance amounts to a dignity violation.179  In the Freedom 
                                                
173  Ibid 1294. 
174  Section 36(1). 
175  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC),  2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC) at par 30. See also L Johannessen “A Critical View of the 
Constitutional Hate Speech Provision” (1997) Vol 13 The South African Journal on Human 
Rights 140. See Milo D Milo, G Penfold and A Stein “Freedom of Expression” in S Woolman, 
T Roux, M Bishop (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2006), Second Edition, Vol 3, 
Juta & Co Ltd 42- 9 where it is stated that “[t]he effect of the limitations clause is that the 
same document [the Constitution] that entrenches freedom of expression as a fundamental 
right itself acknowledges that this right is neither absolute nor pre-eminent”. 
176  Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority & Others 2002 (4) SA 294 
(CC), 2002 (5) BCLR 433 (CC). 
177  Ibid par 31.  
178  Ibid par 34. 
179 E Neisser “Hate Speech in the new South Africa: Constitutional considerations for a land 
recovering from decades of racial repression and violence” (1994) Vol 10 The South African 
Journal on Human Rights 355.  
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Front Case180 a complaint was lodged with the South African Human Rights 
Commission by a political party, the Freedom Front.181 The complaint was 
based on the slogan ‘[k]ill the Farmer, kill the Boer’ chanted by members of a 
political party namely the African National Congress at a meeting of the ANC 
Youth League and thereafter at the funeral of an ANC leader, Mr Peter 
Mokaba.182 The Freedom Front argued that “the slogan amounted to hate 
speech and was therefore proscribed by the ... [Constitution]”.183 The South 
African Human Rights Commission rejected the argument proposed by the 
Freedom Front on the basis that “although the slogans may be distasteful and 
hurtful”184, they were not categorised as hate speech as envisaged by section 
16(2) of the Constitution.185 The Freedom Front appealed the aforementioned 
determination.186 Upon appeal, the South African Human Rights Commission 
headed by the chairperson Govender K, having regard to the publication of the 
aforementioned slogan and political events, stated that there “can be no doubt 
that the slogan, given its content, its history and the context in which it was 
chanted, would harm the sense of well being, contribute directly to a feeling of 
marginalisation, and adversely affect the dignity of Afrikaners”.187 Hence, the 
South African Human Rights Commission then found that the aforementioned 
chanted slogan amounts to “hate speech as defined in section 16(2) (c) of the 
Constitution”.188 
 
Regarding the liability of the political party for unauthorised hate speech 
utterances by members of the party, for example, occurring at rallies held by 
the party, the South African Human Rights Commission confirmed that 
“organisers of rallies [political parties] may be held responsible for hate 
speech uttered at such rallies”.189 The determining factor as stated in the 
                                                
180 Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 
1283 (SAHRC).  
181  Ibid 1286. 
182  Ibid. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
185  Ibid. 
186  Ibid. 
187  Ibid 1299. 
188  Ibid 1300. 
189  Ibid 1299. 
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Freedom Front Case190depends on “whether tacit or direct encouragement was 
given to the hate speech, the extent to which the organisers disassociated 
themselves from the views expressed and the efforts that were made to stop 
the utterances”.191 In the aforementioned case, the Chairperson found no 
evidence “which suggests that the ANC encouraged either directly or 
indirectly the chanting of the slogan at either event and [the ANC did] clearly 
[disassociate] itself from the slogan”192, failing which an apology would have 
been necessary.193 
 
In the Afriforum Case194, Afriforum (hereinafter referred to as “the first 
applicant”) and Transvaal Agricultural Union of South Africa (hereinafter 
referred to as “the second applicant”) approached the High Court on an urgent 
basis seeking the following relief namely: 
 
 “[p]ending the final adjudication of a complaint laid by the first applicant at the Equality 
Court in Johannesburg on 12 March 2010, the respondent is interdicted and restrained 
from publicly uttering words or singing any songs or communicate lyrics using words 
which can reasonably be understood or construed as being capable of instigating 
violence, distrust and/or hatred between black and white citizens in the Republic of South 
Africa ...”195.  
 
The aforementioned relief was sought by the applicants against Julius Malema 
(hereinafter referred to as “the first Respondent”), the applicants being 
aggrieved by the song “Avudubele Ibulu”, translated as "shoot the boer or 
farmer”.196 The political party, the African National Congress and the African 
National Congress Youth League was joined as the second and third 
respondent respectively.197 The legal representative of the first respondent 
stated on behalf of the first respondent that should the court grant the order 
sought by the applicants, such order “would infringe first respondent's 
                                                
190  Ibid. 
191  Ibid. 
192  Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194  Afriforum and Another v Malema 2010 ZAGPPHC 39 (1 April 2010) available at    
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2010/39.html. 
195  Ibid 3. 
196  Ibid. 
197  Ibid. 
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constitutional rights to freedom of expression”.198 The applicants, however, 
pursued the granting of the interim interdict and referred to the findings of the 
chairperson in the Freedom Front Case199 in support of their argument that 
“[t]he words ‘shoot the farmer’ can hardly be distinguished from the words 
‘kill the boer, kill the farmer’ ”200, the slogan according to the applicants, 
having already been declared hate speech in the aforementioned case.201 
Furthermore, the applicants referred to section 10 of the Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act202 as a yardstick for determining 
whether the words in the song "Avudubele Ibulu" amounts to hate speech.203  
The definition of hate speech in accordance with the aforementioned Act204 is 
“words based upon one or more of the prohibited grounds (Unfair 
discrimination generally or unfair discrimination on the ground of race, gender 
or disability) ... that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear 
intention to - a) Be hurtful; b) Be harmful or to incite harm; c) Promote or 
propagate hatred.”205 The court found that the words in the song “Avudubele 
Ibulu” amounts to hate speech206 and confirmed that “there is neither 
justification, nor protection in the Constitution” for hate speech. The reason 
being that it: 
 
 “cannot be contested that applicants' members and others are offended and alarmed, if 
not threatened by the song …. [and the court stated that participants] in the political and 
socio-political discourse must remain sensitive to the feelings and perceptions of other 
South Africans when words were used that were common during the struggle days, but 
may be experienced as harmful by fellow inhabitants of South Africa today”.207  
 
                                                
198  Ibid 5. 
199  Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 (11) BCLR 
1283 (SAHRC). 
200  Afriforum and Another v Malema 2010 ZAGPPHC 39 (1 April 2010) available at    
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2010/39.html 7. 
201  Ibid 5. See also Freedom Front v South African Human Rights Commission and Another 2003 
(11) BCLR 1283 (SAHRC) 1300. 
202  Act 4 of 2000. 
203  Afriforum and Another v Malema 2010 ZAGPPHC 39 (1 April 2010) available at    
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2010/39.html 8. 
204  Act 4 of 2000. 
205  Section 10 of Act 4 of 2000. 
206  Afriforum and Another v Malema 2010 ZAGPPHC 39 (1 April 2010) available at    
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2010/39.html 9. 
207  Ibid. 
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As with the nature of urgent matters, the finding of the court was 
provisional.208 With regard to the facts of the case and the role of mediation in 
ensuring the protection of the dignity of persons in circumstances such as 
those before the aforementioned court, Bertelsmann J further ordered that this 
matter be referred to the equality court.209 
 
 
                                                
208  Ibid. 
209  Ibid 10. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
The starting point of the discussion determines how political parties are 
governed by the Constitution. The discussion confirms that the enactment of 
the Interim Constitution guaranteed and that presently, the existence of our 
supreme Constitution, guarantees the enforcement of political rights for all 
South African citizens. It has been mentioned, within the context of this 
dissertation, that although the Constitution guarantees citizens “political 
rights”, the Constitution does not define “political parties” despite the evident 
link between political parties and political rights in our multi-party democracy. 
The definition of political parties therefore stems from case law.  
 
The constitutional provisions applicable to political parties and political rights 
are section 21 of the Interim Constitution and section 19 of the Constitution. 
These provisions, more particularly section 19 of the Constitution, set the 
scene for the development of this study. An analysis of section 19 reveals that 
its incorporation in the Bill of Rights gives higher status to rights of a political 
nature. Although South African law supports the unrestricted formation of 
political parties, an essential part of the formation process entails the 
registration of political parties with the Electoral Commission. This 
registration requirement is a prerequisite for political parties to participate in 
any election. Also, the electoral officer is governed by statute and therefore 
cannot register a party if the party does not meet the requirements, as 
discussed in Chapter two of this dissertation.   
 
Moreover, legislation that regulates party financial matters presently is the 
Public Funding of Represented Political Parties Act. There is to date no other 
legislation that has been formulated to regulate the functioning of political 
parties in democratic South Africa.  For example, the internal organisation of 
political parties and vicarious liability matters are not dealt with in any South 
African statute. The regulation of parties by statute is a recommendation to 
ensure a just political order whereby the functioning of political parties is in 
line with the Constitution.   
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As stated in the introduction, electoral matters are relevant to political parties. 
Of interest is case law dealing with various aspects such as party list disputes 
and the Electoral Commission’s refusal to register a party.  The court found 
that the parties failed to comply with the procedural requirements imposed by 
electoral legislation. Consequently, according to case law, compliance with 
legislation is paramount and non-compliance by parties with the procedural 
requirements imposed by electoral legislation will not result in leniency by the 
courts.   
 
Also, the right to free, fair and regular elections is a topic which is of 
importance to political parties. As noted above, the Electoral Commission and 
electoral legislation facilitate democratic electoral processes”1 in order to 
uphold free, fair and regular elections in South Africa. It therefore follows that 
in order for the Electoral Commission to fulfil this facilitation role, its 
independence must at all times be upheld. It has been determined that any 
violation of the Electoral Commission’s independence may result in an 
infringement of the right to free, fair and regular elections. Case law was 
discussed in this regard and the co-operative governance principle was 
explained. As discussed in chapter three, co-operative governance requires 
that the case before court “should where possible be resolved at a political 
level rather than through adversarial litigation”.2 Importantly, the court found 
that the Electoral Commission need not comply with the principal of co-
operative governance because the Commission did not possess the 
characteristics of an “organ of state”. Political parties were therefore permitted 
to approach the court for relief as the case involved a dispute between the 
Electoral Commission and the government. 
 
Furthermore, the constitutional court confirmed that “[i]ndispensable to any 
democratic process is that political parties will ensure that their potential 
                                                
1  Section 4 of the Electoral Commission Act.  
2  Ibid 14-18. Also see Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In Re 
Certification of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC) par 291. Also see Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality 
2001 (3) SA 925 (CC), 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) par 30-31. 
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supporters are aware of the prerequisites of voting and comply with them”.3 
The right to vote forms a part of the Bill of Rights and it is regulated by 
legislation. Legislation provides a list of persons who are not entitled to vote. 
Party members or South African citizens, must register to vote otherwise they 
will be prohibited from voting. Also, having the incorrect documentation 
prohibits persons from exercising their right to vote. In this regard, case law 
was discussed above.   
 
In light of the constitutional right to stand for public office, a link between 
party membership and this right ensues because “[a]n individual may become 
a member of the legislature ... by virtue of the proportional support obtained 
by the party to which the individual belongs, together with his or her position 
on the ‘party list’”.4 This link may give rise to party list disputes.  As 
mentioned above, the following recommendation is proposed: that the 
legislature formulates legislation that addresses issues such as the candidate 
selection process and the compiling of party lists, provided that the legislation 
at no time conflicts with the Constitution and the constitution of South African 
parties.  
 
According to case law discussed in chapter four, the right to freedom of 
expression may apply horizontally and bind political parties. Furthermore, as 
noted above, all forms of expression are protected by the Constitution except 
those forms of expression that are expressly excluded by the Constitution. The 
chapter dealing with the right to freedom of expression comprises of a detailed 
discussion that derive from the applicability of this right to political parties. 
Hate speech is also taken into consideration with reference to case law.  There 
is no legislation that regulates hate speech in South Africa. In conclusion, the 
formation of legislation to regulate this area of law, as applicable to political 
parties and their members is recommended. 
                                                
3  New National Party of South Africa v Government of the RSA and Others 1999(5) BCLR 489  
(CC) at par 42.  
4  Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape and Others 2001 JOL 8206 (C) 25. 
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